

THE MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus*.

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke*.

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THE ELEVENTH CONFERENCE OF MODERN CHURCHMEN

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IT was indeed a happy inspiration which led the Churchmen's Union to choose the subject of their recent Conference. There are several 'open sores' in the life of the Church to-day, but the alienation of science from religion is one of them; and it is to the members of this Union that we naturally look to take steps towards healing it. Each important group in the Church of England has its special contribution to make to that unity which we all desire; and, just as in the past it has been the 'Evangelicals' who could best approach the Nonconformists, and the 'Catholics' who could best approach the Eastern Christians and the Churches of the Roman obedience, so it is the 'Modern Churchmen' who can best approach the men of science who are alienated from religion. In all these cases alike, sectional action is at first desirable. It can create a better atmosphere, and remove many a needless misunderstanding; and, if at first the real difficulties are not fully grasped, that may be all to the good, since it is best for those long separated to know one another better before they attempt to deal with them. Thus, if this article is in some ways critical, it is not from any lack of

sympathy and appreciation on the part of the writer. The Conference was, in his judgment, most successful, and many of the papers permanently valuable. There was no narrowness shown in the choice of the speakers, the intention evidently being that various standpoints should be represented. The purpose of this article is not so much to criticize as to deal with a few points, as to which misunderstanding evidently exists, and so to forward the reconciliation which the promoters had in view.

What, let us first ask, is the source of that alienation of science from religion which to some extent prevails? It is possible no doubt to exaggerate it. There are many theologians who take an interest in science, and many men of science who are devout Christians. But no one alive to facts can be satisfied with the present situation; not only is it unnatural, but it is comparatively new. There is no reason why men of science should be less religious than other men, or why religious men should be hostile to science. If, as the history of thought proves, the world does to the normal mind declare the glory of God, we should expect science to make for religion, and the love of God to lead to a special interest in all the works of His Hand. How, then, can alienation arise? Is it, as seems sometimes to be supposed, that theologians set up dogmas inconsistent with truth, and then shriek or persecute when these dogmas are attacked? The truths most important for religion have little connection with scientific inquiry, and religious men have normally no quarrel with it; they are frequently even over-ready to accept what men of science are supposed to say. Let us consider the facts. The early Hebrews had their naïve stories of the origin of the world; we find one of them in the second chapter of Genesis. But they took over with docility the views of the Babylonians, who were supposed to understand cosmology; and the first chapter of Genesis gives a different account of the creation from that of the second, and a much better one. The Christian Church acted similarly. The cosmology of the Middle Ages was not derived from Scripture but from Greece and Alexandria; it was in fact inconsistent with the letter of Scripture, as Galileo had occasion to point out. The same spirit appears in lesser matters. St. Clement of Rome has a very strange story about the phoenix—a 'morn

fearful wildfowl,' it would seem, even than Bottom's lion. But St. Clement took it over the zoology of his day; who was he to dispute what the men of science told him? So it has generally been. / *Cuique sua arte credendum.* Christians, to take an example nearer to our own day, did not draw the theory of special creations primarily from the Bible, though it fits the Biblical narrative well enough; before Darwin it was the accepted view of science itself, and maintained by purely scientific arguments. Men of science in their turn have generally accepted the teaching of theologians in their own subject; indeed the theologian and the man of science have often been united in the same person. The pious and respected Canon, Copernic, was the author of a revolution in astronomy: and, in England, Sir Isaac Newton was not content to apply his mathematical abilities to the heavenly bodies; he applied them to the Book of Daniel also, though not, it may be feared, with equal success. Even when in the seventeenth century the attention of educated Englishmen was largely turned from theology to experimental science, there was no divorce between science and religion: England has been particularly rich in men of science who were devout Christians. How then, we again ask, can trouble arise? It may be well just to indicate one or two minor difficulties before passing to the serious one.

First, then, we should notice that there is frequently a tendency in religious men to be unduly conservative in their intellectual outlook, just as there is to be unduly conservative in politics. What they desire is, as St. Paul says, to 'lead a tranquil and quiet life in all godliness and gravity'; and anything 'disturbing' is unwelcome, as drawing the mind away from the eternal realities. Moreover, as we grow older and more tired, we become less disposed to reconsider our views. The people who are obscurantist with selfish ends in view here find their opportunity; and they exploit religion much as evildoers of a different kind exploit the supposed teachings of science. Religion gets the discredit of the one class, as science the discredit of the other. In the second place, both men of science and men of religion are frequently without any philosophical training. They do not understand the symbolic, or the hypothetical, character of the conceptions with which they work;

they take them far too seriously; and base upon them preposterous views as to the nature of reality. But thirdly—and this is far more important—those who are deeply influenced by the Christian religion have very much at heart the moral and religious interests of the great mass of mankind; and they find it difficult to separate the question of the truth of a view presented to them from that of its probable effect upon the minds of men. Which of us to-day, who cares deeply for morality, finds it easy to consider impartially the views of Freud? The probable consequences of their wide acceptance weigh down the scales all the time. Are then, it will be asked, religious men justified in trying to suppress inconvenient truth? The question does not present itself to a religious man in that way. What occurs is this. When a conclusion is unwelcome to us, the arguments for it seem weaker than they are, and the objections urged against it stronger; and the mind becomes preternaturally fertile in expedients for escaping it. Let us consider the classical example. Whenever the relations of religion to science come up for discussion, we are sure to hear once more of Galileo; and the reason is, not that his condemnation was characteristic of the attitude of the Church to science, but that it was entirely exceptional. Indeed, there can be no better testimony to the real attitude of the Church than the fact that those who attack it go back nearly three hundred years to find cause for complaint. The question of persecution, or punishment for the spreading of opinions believed to be contrary to the public interest, is a very difficult one, however little Englishmen—except in time of war—may recognize the fact. But the Church, though often horribly severe to heresy in religion, has interfered very little with science. Let us by all means consider the case of Galileo; we shall find it much more instructive than at first it seems.

Was then the Church really adverse to progress in astronomy? No doubt many of the older astronomers were so, as Copernic found. But there was great interest in astronomy before Copernic's day. The solar system was not his discovery. The Egyptians made Venus and Mercury revolve round the sun, and Apollonius of Perga made the other planets then known do the same. Nobody minded what the planets did.

Aquinas himself, in his Commentary upon Aristotle's *de Caelo*, though regarding the Ptolemaic system as giving the best account of 'the appearances,' shows himself by no means satisfied with it.¹ But when Copernic, perhaps anticipated by the Pythagoreans, found himself driven to the conclusion that the earth itself went round the sun, the situation was immediately altered. This view appeared to be contrary to plain, everyday experience. The Scripture statement, with which Galileo was pressed, '*Terra autem in aeternum stabit, quia terra in aeternum stat*,' simply tells us what we all seem to know without it. But, though Galileo might be attacked on grounds of Scripture and common-sense, the real objection to his teaching lay deeper. Not only did it do away with the view of the universe, by the help of which the truths of the Creed were pictured, but it appeared to make men far less important than had been supposed, and so to throw doubt upon Christianity as the religion of redemption. It is easy to be wise after the event, and ridicule the Holy Office for condemning Galileo. But then, as now, 'the teaching of science' meant the established teaching of men of science, and 'the teaching of Scripture' the teaching of Scripture as generally interpreted; and Galileo's views were contrary to both, as the Holy Office declared them to be. Not even Francis Bacon accepted the Copernican astronomy. But the real objection lay deeper, as the Oxford Conference itself brought out. Thoughtful Christians will not agree with all that Dr. Macpherson said. Value has nothing to do with size; nor does the size of the universe at all affect the care of the Father for the smallest of His creatures. To think that it must do so is not only to set aside our Lord's teaching; it is to forget the character of divine knowledge, and assimilate it to our own. The figures given to us were no doubt impressive; and they would be much more so, if our imagination could grasp them. But are we down-hearted? If we are inclined to be so, let us reflect upon another fact equally impressive, the fact that he is able to give them to us. Galileo quotes Plato as saying that human understanding partakes of divinity, since it understands the nature of numbers. Must not men be very near akin to God, if he can think God's

¹ I owe this fact to Professor de Burgh.

thoughts after Him as amazingly as this?² And, if he is so near akin, is it after all so strange that God should have done for him what the Christian faith declares Him to have done? What has astronomy—*pace* Dr. Macpherson—to do with Christology?

God has other Words for other worlds,
But for this world the Word of God is Christ.

If other worlds have needed an Incarnation of the Divine Word, we may be sure that they have had it; for with God, as the earliest Christian lover of astronomy has said, there 'can be no variation, neither shadow that is cast by turning.' But the immediate point is this. If one so intelligent as Dr. Macpherson feels as he does, what would the Holy Office expect the millions to feel? The Great War, in which the prizes are the souls of men, is ever going on; it was the business of the Holy Office to administer a continual D.O.R.A. Was it to allow Galileo to give teaching so dangerous in the teeth, as it then appeared, of Scripture, science, and common-sense? The wildest ultramontane does not maintain the infallibility of the Holy Office; but are all courts of justice to wait until they are infallible before they give any decisions? The decision of the Holy Office in the *cause célèbre* of Galileo, as in that of St. Joan, was right on the facts before it; and, according to the ideas of the day, Galileo seems to have been treated quite leniently.

But Galileo has been dead for some centuries. Let us leave those 'old, unhappy, far-off things' and turn to the present situation. It is only for the light thrown upon the present that it is worth while to refer to Galileo at all. The open sore, which the Modern Churchmen are seeking to 'mollify with oil,' really dates from Mid-Victorian days. Why did Christians feel so great an alarm at the teaching of Mid-Victorian science, and display so great a hostility to it? First, they thought that it contradicted Scripture. Secondly, they thought that it banished God from the universe, and denied it to be the expression of His purpose. Thirdly, they thought that it denied the reality

² The essential kinship of the nature of man with the nature of God is just as much a commonplace of the best theology as the essential difference of the one from the other. Perhaps the finest exposition of this truth in our language is found in Isaac Barrow's magnificent Seventh Sermon on the Creed.

of moral distinctions, and so the truth of the Christian religion, to which their reality is essential. Let us consider these points one by one.

The first objection, however large it may have bulked in the popular mind, was much the least important. Every account of the world, which rises above early Hebrew thought, is contrary to the letter of Scripture; and the doctrine of evolution was contrary to it just as the mediaeval cosmology had been. The same considerations which had justified Christians in accepting the views of Aristotle would have justified them, as far as Scripture was concerned, in accepting the views of Darwin. Few educated Christians to-day hold the Mid-Victorian view of the Bible, but Darwin has had very little to do with the change: historical criticism has been a far more potent factor. But let us be perfectly honest about the matter. It is of course true that the Church has never corporately committed itself to the view of inspiration current in Darwin's day. But when those who are not theologians speak of what the Church teaches, they mean what the teachers of the Church commonly proclaim from the pulpit, nor can they be expected to mean anything else. Let us say then frankly that the Church in Mid-Victorian days taught the infallibility of the letter of Scripture; and, in so teaching, taught erroneously. We teach to-day nothing of the kind. If the Scripture difficulty was real once, it is not real now; and at the late Conference nothing was said about it.

The second objection was far more serious, and it has not yet entirely passed away. Not all men of science yet speak as Professor Haldane spoke. But after the admirable way in which he and others dealt with the question of divine purpose, it is quite unnecessary to deal with it here. Even in Mid-Victorian days it was soon seen that the doctrine of evolution in no way banished teleology; Huxley himself, epiphenomenalist as he was, in some degree recognized this. What the new teaching did was to give us new and much truer views as to the nature of the purpose which the world reveals, and the way in which it is being realized. But may we ask one thing more of the men of science, who are not materialists, and repudiate the 'block-universe'? It is that they should help us more than as yet they do to deal with that 'desiccated science'—to use Professor

Haldane's words—which to thousands is so great a hindrance to the attainment of a reasonable faith. It is desiccated science, and not only desiccated theology, which is keeping the sore open. The best theologians of all schools of thought are really trying to deal with desiccated theology, but they cannot with effect deal with the other evil. If the sore is open, and hard to heal, the fault has not been by any means on one side alone. Just as frankly as we ought to say that 'the Church' of Mid-Victorian days was in error, men of science ought to say that the 'science' of Mid-Victorian days was in error, and to say it clearly, publicly, and repeatedly. The infallibility of 'science' is just as much a superstition as the infallibility of the Bible.

But it is the third objection which is the abiding one; and it is one purpose of this paper to point out that at the Conference, as far as we can judge from the papers read, it was never faced. Mr. Russell just touched upon it, and immediately put it aside; no one else—not even Mr. Hardwick, whose subject demanded the most careful dealing with the difficulty—paid any attention to it. The difficulty is this. Science—and philosophy also, though for a rather different reason—is not at all comfortable with the Christian insistence upon the freedom of the will. Science is inclined to demand, not merely an ordered universe, but a universe ordered in a particular way. Just as the ideal of philosophy is the complete understanding of all reality, so the ideal of science is such an understanding of that aspect of reality with which it deals that it shall be always able to predict the future. It is extremely indisposed to 'let contingency into the heart of things.' But this is what the vast majority of Christians insist upon doing. No doubt there have been great Christian thinkers who were determinists; Determinism seems necessarily to follow from the later views of St. Augustine, and from those of Calvin. But the Church has now practically made up its mind about the intellectual and moral consequences of determinism, and will have none of it. From the first in the East, and generally in the West also, the human will has been regarded as a real factor in the course of events, and it is held that the choices which it will make are not to be predicted, though a timeless knowledge may no doubt embrace them. On this view the Church insists for two reasons.

The first is that the reality of moral responsibility can apparently be maintained upon no other terms; the second is that upon no other terms does it seem possible to justify the ways of God to men. This creative action of the will is profoundly mysterious, as all creative action must be; it is possible to urge almost insuperable difficulties against every way of asserting its reality. But the Christian will maintain that the tendency of much modern philosophy to condemn as appearance all that cannot immediately be rationalized is a tendency fundamentally mistaken; it takes our intellectual capacity much too seriously; and he will insist that the belief in responsibility is as fundamental as the belief in reason itself. Not to let contingency into the heart of things is to let Pyrrhonism into it instead.

Now it is needless to say that men of science for all the practical purposes of life believe in human responsibility as much as anybody; but theoretically it constitutes a grave difficulty. They are naturally disposed, like Mr. Russell, to devote a dozen lines to a recognition of the problem, and leave it to be dealt with at a more convenient season. Let us understand why. Not only does the admission of freedom necessitate a definite answer to the central problem of psycho-physics, and that not the one most congenial to them; but it shatters not only on the higher levels of existence, but in a measure on the lower also, the particular kind of order that they wish the world to exhibit. These men and women, who claim to act freely—at any rate in a great deal that they do—are in possession of bodies; and if they can freely move their bodies, their bodies can affect other things. These 'occasional interferences' are a great deal more serious than the 'occasional interferences' with which miracles are popularly identified; for, while the wonder-working God is supposed only to 'interfere' on rare occasions, the wonder-working men and women are interfering all the time. Thus it is quite idle to strain out the gnat of miracle, and swallow the camel of freedom. The great leaders of Mid-Victorian science saw this clearly enough, and were definitely determinist; what we want to know is whether the leaders of modern science, whom we find so much nearer to us in many ways, have drawn nearer to us here also. It may be wise, as we have already recognized, to deal with other pro-

blems before we tackle the great one; but to this question of freedom, and the psycho-physical problem which lies behind it, we are bound to come; and the matter is as urgent in psychology as it is in physics. In a word, do the men of science believe in the reality of moral evil, or sin? If they do, the last of the Mid-Victorian Christian's objection to the teaching of science will have passed away. But if they do not, we will not say that there can be no reconciliation with religion; for there are many religions, and very few Christians are more religious than Spinoza and the great Indian thinkers. But we must say that there can be no reconciliation yet with the Christian religion.

Now do not let us attempt to heal this hurt 'slightly, saying Peace, Peace, when there is no peace'; the sore will only fester and break out again. It is, *e.g.* futile to give a difficult meaning to the word 'free,' the meaning characteristic of St. John and St. Augustine, and then say that true freedom does not involve contingent decisions of the will, or the saints in Paradise would not be free. That is simply to talk about something else. Nor again is it of any use to speak of the world as exhibiting moral as well as intellectual and aesthetic values, without entering upon the question how the moral values arise. In a true sense, any action which is determined by a moral end possesses moral value, whether this action involves the overcoming of temptation or not. But this is not the question before us. In point of fact we are all engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle with temptation; sometimes we stand, sometimes we fall; the question is whether the action that we take could be other than it is. Let it be understood that instructed Christians are, and have always been, firm believers in order: 'Order is heaven's first law.' Even those whose belief in miracles is least critical believe that all miracles, looked at from the highest standpoint, are examples of order, not contraventions of it; St. Augustine is as emphatic on this point as Bishop Butler. 'The being of God,' as Hooker says, 'is a kind of law to His working'; and there could hardly be a greater misunderstanding of what Christians understand by miracles than to suppose that they regard them as divine afterthoughts. As will presently appear, it is a lack of attention to the implications of human

freedom, which causes this misunderstanding to arise. Nor again will Christians generally be in any doubt as to the reign of law in the inorganic world, in so far as it is unaffected by human activity. Pluralists may doubt whether even here uniformity is as rigid as it is supposed to be, but Christians usually welcome the thought of uniformity here as most desirable for the purposes of freedom itself. There is nothing new about this. Indeed the order of nature was entirely familiar to the Jews themselves. The rainbow was to them a perpetual memorial of it; God had 'made fast' the heavenly bodies 'for ever and ever,' and 'given them a law which shall not be broken.' There are few more beautiful passages in the Old Testament than that in which Yahweh declares that Israel can no more cease to be a nation, than 'the ordinances of the moon and stars can depart from before Him.' The legal metaphor was almost as familiar to the Hebrews as to ourselves, in speaking of the order of nature; and it is indeed difficult to follow Mr. Hardwick's language upon this point. When, however, he speaks of the presence in nature of various levels of existence, we follow him very gladly, though we would suggest that the word uniformity is only suitable to the conception of the block-universe, and that the word multiformity would express his meaning much better. A similar criticism suggests itself of the expression 'emergent evolution.' To say that the higher level of existence 'emerges' from the lower slurs the scientific problem instead of solving it. The problem is whether the higher level can, or cannot, find its scientific explanation in the lower. The materialist says that it can, because it must; Prof. Haldane denies this; the use of the word 'emergent' seems designed to suggest that it can and cannot at the same time. But even if we accept under protest this word, the real question is whether at the highest level of existence of which we have experience, freedom 'emerges.' The Christian insists that it does. Evolution finds its climax in man, who freely chooses what his ends shall be; and the order of the world is one that finds a place for freedom, and for all that has followed from it, both of human sin and sorrow, and of divine redemption. To Christians the moral order of the universe is rather a *desideratum* than a present fact; we must co-operate, and are made to co-operate,

with God for the establishment of His kingdom; and, if that be so, God's action can no more be rigidly determined than our own. The divine Master and Friend must take us as he finds us, and adapt His grace to our varying need of it; there can be no co-operation on any other terms. But it is not our present purpose to enter into the rationale of redemptive 'miracle'; it is quite premature to do so until the problem of freedom has been faced. If many members of the Conference did not like Dr. Tennant's paper, it was perhaps in part because he is so very normal a Christian in his insistence upon the freedom of the will, and so determined to admit nothing that is inconsistent with it. Christians will be glad to learn from men of science, especially from the psychologists, in what way their convictions, in view of modern knowledge, can be best expressed. Though the present writer has spoken of the will in order to be most widely intelligible, he does not hold the old faculty-psychology. But if men of science want the conviction of a limited freedom to be abandoned, there is 'nothing doing'; Christians will simply wait till the men of science here change their minds as they have so largely changed them on the question of divine purpose. We quite understand their intellectual unwillingness to admit what we claim; a universe in which the future can always be predicted, if we know the past and the present, is a conception very inspiring to those who desire to be of service to their fellowmen. But it is quite illegitimate to turn desires and ideals into postulates; what we should like is one thing, and what we can have is generally another. The postulate of uniformity has no doubt been progressively verified on the lower level where Christians admit it; it has not been, nor can it be, verified on the higher.

And now, before closing this paper, it may be well to add one thing more. The men of science at the Conference not infrequently referred to doctrines of Christianity which they were unable to accept. No schedule of these doctrines was provided, but apparently what was especially in their minds was the doctrine of 'original' sin. May we assure them that, if only they can agree with us as to the reality of 'actual' sin, they will find no difficulty in the doctrine of 'original' sin whatever? But they must learn what it is. Apparently they

suppose us to believe that the instincts which lie at the root of human and animal behaviour, and which in ourselves need careful regulation if there is to be any unified character, are in themselves reprehensible, and the result of Adam's fall. Now St. Augustine undoubtedly held something of this kind; and in the West, though not in the East, his influence was for a time very great, especially in the Thomist theology. May we say in passing how interesting it was to notice, even at the Modern Churchmen's Conference, how St. Thomas is coming into his own? But we must not, in spite of Professor de Burgh's admirable exposition of Catholic philosophy in modern language, and Mr. Hanson's delightful bombshells, make a Grand Lama of St. Thomas; there are other schools of Catholic theology. The views of St. Augustine on original sin have found an abiding home rather in Protestantism than in Catholicism; and it is not at all surprising that Scotsmen, even more than Englishmen, tend to identify Augustinianism with the faith of Christendom. But that is a serious error. What theologians call 'concupiscence' is not very different from what the new psychology calls 'libido,' and has a similar breadth of meaning; and that concupiscence is, strictly speaking, sin, is not only not the doctrine of the Church, but since the Council of Trent is, for Roman Catholics, a definitely heretical view. Sin—to speak once more the language of the faculty-psychology—lies in the will. No mere 'urge' can possibly be sin; sin lies in the refusal to control and regulate it in accordance with the moral end, when we are able to do so. If men of science want to understand the views of ordinary Christians both as to the nature of sin, and as to the limits of free action, they should read the early chapters, '*De Humanis Actibus*,' in some work on Moral Theology. Those of us, who in the confessional and out of it are called to help their brothers and sisters in their moral struggles, have to explain the real facts again and again, and the doctrine of evolution is of great assistance to us. It is true that the Anglican article, 'Of Original Sin,' cautious as its language is, gives a different impression; but the clergy are not, and for many years have not been, tied to every clause which the Articles contain. But now difficult questions arise. First, is it the case that the psychological 'urge,' as we ourselves experience

it, is as unperverted as in the animals it appears to be? And secondly, whatever answer we give to this question, how comes it that universally we find ourselves so unable or so unwilling to deal with this 'urge' as we ought? That is a fact very strange to ethical theists. We should have expected that, when in the course of evolution the moral consciousness 'emerged,' God would have provided us with some power, some 'original righteousness,' by which we might rightly deal with tendencies so dangerous to our moral and spiritual welfare; and this He does not appear immediately to have done. Now this moral weakness of ours is what Christians awkwardly describe as original sin—awkwardly, since it is certainly not sin, and possibly not original. This weakness is not a dogma, but a fact, which, as Mr. Chesterton has said, anyone can see by reading his diary, or looking out of the window. The Jews, as Mr. N. P. Williams has lately taught us, possessed three alternative theories to account for the facts, and modern writers have added others. But no one of them, not even that which St. Paul himself adopted, is any necessary part of the Christian faith. If men of science can solve the difficulty for us, as perhaps they may do, we shall be much obliged. If they cannot, they will be no worse off than we are, and there will be nothing in the fact to part us one from another.

NEW TESTAMENT MODERNISM AND THE CHURCH OF TO-DAY*

By the Rev. ARTHUR PRINGLE, Chairman of the Congregational Union
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IT will be a fitting sequel to what I said in May on the True Fundamentalism if this morning I speak on New Testament Modernism and the Church of To-day. It is a subject that has a doubly vital relation to us at the present time.

First, it is incumbent on us to come to a clear understanding with ourselves concerning Modernism. Ought it any longer to be, amongst educated people, a term of suspicion or reproach

* The Address delivered from the Chair of the Congregational Union of England and Wales on October 14th, 1924.

or even a distinctive label marking a man as exceptional or advanced? Ought not the most timid and conservative to be impressed and reassured if we find, as I think we shall, that the New Testament, in relation to its own time, is essentially and boldly modernist?

Second, it is no less incumbent on us to come to a clear understanding with ourselves concerning the Church. It is significant that New Testament Modernism issued in a Church full of hopeful vitality.

Is it impossible, then, for us to recapture the spirit that animated the New Testament?

As I have already suggested, the best way to get at the secret is frankly to recognize *the essential thoroughgoing Modernism of the New Testament*. Everywhere it is full of provocative, disturbing, life-giving freshness. There is vital significance in the fact on which Dr. James Moffatt lays such stress, namely, that 'the study of the New Testament, like the study of history in general, teaches us not to be afraid of change in our religion'; and he goes on to say, 'Once we realize all that was meant by the extension of the Gospel to non-Jews during the first generation, or by the re-interpretation of Christianity in Paulinism and in the Fourth Gospel, we find it hard to conceive any demand for alteration in our day which could not be answered by the same spirit of vital energy.'

From beginning to end, the New Testament is, in relation to the orthodoxies and cherished beliefs of its own time, startlingly modern. With all our conjecture and imagination, can we really think ourselves into what it meant for the men of that day to hear Christ say, 'It was said by them of old time, but I say unto you'? Can we realize the consternation caused by St. Paul's declaration, 'He is a Jew who is one inwardly'? For disturbing penetration and boldness, where is the present-day apologetic to match the Epistle to the Hebrews? Freshness of statement, adaptation of thought, welcoming of new light, claiming the right of believers in all ages to speak of their experience in their own way—all this is in the New Testament. 'Even as it is written *we believed, and therefore have we spoken*; we also believe and therefore also we speak.'

What is this but first-century Modernism, the faith clothing

itself in new garments, the treasure breaking the old vessels and depositing itself in the new?

And so it has always been with the faith: that, indeed, is the only way in which it could have been carried from age to age and lived afresh in each successive time. As a group of priests remarked in an open letter to Pius X, seventeen years ago, 'a change in apologetic is apostolic in principle.' The hackneyed remark that all orthodoxies were once heterodoxies is but another way of saying the same thing. The most daringly 'advanced' thought is destined to grow hopelessly old-fashioned; for the penalty of being modern is the certainty that you will in due time become ancient. The very fact that you speak the language of your own day means that you will be unconvincing, if not unintelligible, to the day that comes after.

So, when you come to think of it, we have no business to be other than modern, men of our own time, in touch with its thought and speaking its language. The faith once delivered must be constantly reinterpreted. We cannot claim to be ministers of the New Testament unless we have at least some of the New Testament spirit of courage and adventure.

In the light of all this, what becomes of Modernism as a label of reproach or even of distinctiveness? Extremists there will always be, the crude, hurried, change-for-change's-sake left-wingers by whom progress is hampered in every sphere. But it is unnecessary and unworthy to confuse these with the true and scrupulous friends of progress. Putting all else aside, if we attach reality to Christ's promise of the Spirit that will lead us into all the truth, what right have we to stand still or to turn our backs to the light?

There, at all events, is the New Testament for our incentive: all the glory of the Gospel, all the fire of conviction and passion of appeal that its proclamation entails; yet always freshness and adaptability in presentation. It, really, leaves us without excuse for identifying Modernism with negation or rationalism.

Every day we leave this lesson unlearned, the pulpit loses its hold on the people of our time. We *must* speak the lan-

guage they understand and in accordance with the ideas and outlook shared by every educated man. May the time soon come when none of us will be called Modernists because it will be taken for granted that none of us can be anything else.

But my main concern at the moment is to lay stress on one remarkable outcome of New Testament Modernism. All this freshness and vitality issued in a Church full of a life and joy that must needs provoke our envying wonder. At our best we cannot rival it; at our average we hardly seem to belong to the same category. Think of some of the notes of that early Church; if we can only sound them to-day, life will come back to us.

There is, for instance, *the spontaneity of its origin and development*. The Church in the New Testament comes into being naturally, inevitably, as a matter of course. You see no one—not even Christ—formally ordering or founding it; it grows of itself, simply has to be. When men have fellowship with Christ, they *must* have fellowship with each other. And this is what we ought to say to the men of our time, the men who think that the Church is an anachronism, the arbitrary creation of priestly ambition; or at best a temporary expedient which is being left derelict as the stream of progress flows on.

Nothing of the kind. The Church is in the nature of things. When William Morris says 'fellowship is heaven, lack of fellowship is hell,' there may be exaggeration in the language, but there is no exaggeration in the essential meaning. Missed opportunities, stunted development, the futile loneliness that hugs its own fires—these are all fuel for hell, and they all mean lack of fellowship. We were not meant to be alone; and, especially when it comes to the big things, there is that in us which protests against solitariness. 'Individualism may be a City of Refuge: it is difficult to believe that it can become, either on earth or elsewhere, the City of God.'¹

In an age when men everywhere are recognizing the necessity of organization, this is scarcely the time to depreciate organized religion. The 'lonely furrow' has passed into an ominous proverb in the realm of politics. Are not men of good

¹ Scott Palmer.

will and high purpose witnessing through a growing variety of movements to what is essentially the Church-principle—the principle which recognizes that, when you come to human beings, two and two always make more than four? Of course, organized religion can become mechanical and unsatisfying. But so, equally, can individual religion. If organized music in the form of a soulless, inefficient orchestra can spoil a symphony, unorganized music in the person of an incompetent tyro performing on a violin can inflict considerable pain on innocent people.

In short, put it how you will, the Church is the creation and embodiment, however faulty, of an ingrained human instinct. That curious sort of man who, while rather proud of his own abstinence from public worship, is nevertheless uneasy if his wife and children follow his example, is a witness to the deep-seated feeling that there is 'something in' the Church and what it stands for. If it came to the point, few thoughtful people would deliberately hold up their hands for the closing of the churches; and, were they closed to-day, they would be opened again to-morrow or the day after. There, then, is the first mark which the New Testament stamps on the Church—its *inevitability*.

But—and here is a point of great practical moment—no sooner does the New Testament create the Church than it *idealizes* it. You want conclusive textual or formal witness that Christ founded the Church? It is nowhere to be discovered. But there is something better and more wonderful. These men who say nothing about Christ founding the Church in any formal sense, nevertheless build Him up with the Church in all its vicissitudes and strange medley of human nature. The greatest of them dared to say that 'Christ loved the Church and gave Himself for it, that He might present it to Himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing.' And St. Paul ventured this in full view of the petty narrowness, the babyish crankism, the aggravating disappointments and inconsistencies of the Church of his time; to say nothing of other things which he frankly stigmatized as too bad for words. But none of these things moved him. The faddist and the zealot, and that exasperating person generically labelled

the weak brother—difficult to work with, impossible to live with—poisoning the blood of the Church, maiming its limbs: there they were. Nevertheless, each was the brother for whom Christ died; and that was what mattered more than anything else.

Now this touches a tender spot in the modern attitude to the Church. For, mark this, great numbers of people are cold and hostile to the Church not because they find it hard to believe in God, but because they find it impossible to believe in their fellow-men. It is not the God that hides Himself, but the small-minded impossible people who obtrude themselves, who cloud the prospects of the Church.

In other words, the Church is made up of human beings; and, because of this, we must be patient with ourselves and with each other and with our circumstances. The minister who, finding it hard to 'get on' with one uncongenial deacon, forthwith seeks another sphere, is asking for trouble, and may probably meet it in his next Church in the form of two uncongenial deacons. Let such a man heed the warning of Thomas à Kempis: 'The desire of change of place has deceived many a one. It matters less *where* we are than *what* we are. Wherever you are, you carry yourself along with you.' It argues a lack of sense as well as of manliness for a minister to be impatient of human nature or to turn away from it. It is part of the discipline and often of the benediction of men in every sphere that circumstances compel them to learn to appreciate every variety of human nature. And it creates an unfortunate impression when professing Christians, and especially ministers, grow cynical or restless under this inevitable test.

In this connection Baron von Hügel has some counsel we shall be the better for listening to: 'The greater part of cases in the Church of apparently useless friction or depressing isolation spring from no definite badness or wrongheadedness on either side, but simply from the twin facts that we ourselves are rarely free from unreasonable fastidiousness or from the unmanly desire to get without cost: and also our Church superiors, equals and inferiors are men and not angels . . . It remains true that there can be no Church for us on earth if we will not or cannot put up with faulty Church officials and faulty Church members.'

That is good, yet not good enough. For, if we take our faith seriously, it will not be a case of 'putting up with' our fellow officials and members, but of *idealizing* them, thankfully making the best of them, seeing them as among those for whom Christ died. And, if we cannot keep on this high level, we can at least be sensible enough to reflect that, after all, the bright and encouraging side of our Church fellowship is far greater than the other. Do we often enough tell ourselves and other people that while, being human, our churches have their sorry weaknesses, the stuff and fibre of their life is made up of a loyalty and devotion, a generosity of heart and substance, that defy literal record? There is a type of deacon—as, if you come to that, there is a type of minister—that is the despair of the Church and the laughing-stock of the world. But it is outnumbered and swamped by the other type—that fine friend of the minister, that loyal understanding helper, who with all the grace of sacrifice gives himself to the Church.

And when you take the rank and file of our membership, what an aggregate it represents of quiet, unshowy service. This unsensational goodness in our churches ought to move us to gratitude and pride; and one day, perhaps, it will find a worthy chronicler. We are waiting for someone with a touch of Mark Rutherford's genius, but with a more courageously healthy outlook, ready to bear more genial witness to the happier experiences which belong naturally and normally to our churches as we know them to-day. The New Testament should at least teach us to cease all gratuitous self-depreciation and to be fair to the worthier and more heartening side of our church-life.

And now we come to the question, *what sort of faith did New Testament Modernism produce?* Without hesitation it threw away the garments of obsolete thought; without misgiving it watched the removal of the things that were shaken: it acted as though faith were a venture in which it is necessary and worth while to take risks. And with what result? That it was able to say, '*This is the victory that overcometh the world, even our faith.*'

It was a faith that, because it was not afraid of truth, had no need to be afraid of life. It looked at life as nothing else had ever dared to do, with all its sin and heart-break and tragedy.

and showed how these things could be not only met but transfigured. It faced and overcame the great antagonist which the New Testament calls 'the world'; it stood the test of competition with other faiths and out-thought them; best of all, it so inspired its followers that they were able to beat the world in the fine art of good and brave living.

And we, too, only know the value of our faith when we send it into the field to encounter the best the world can produce. The fear of science and criticism and advancing thought, and the failure to make them our allies, fosters the idea that our faith is too weak to stand exposure or competition. Whereas we don't realize its power until we set it against possible alternatives. Men feel the grip of our faith when they ask themselves, 'If not this, what else?' On sheer intellectual grounds Christianity stands amply vindicated to-day. Once it has the sense to throw off obscurantism and timidity, nothing can in any wise hurt it.

But it is when we get to things deeper and of more moment than the merely intellectual that our faith comes to its kingdom. With life as it is and human needs as they are, what else meets the case? Let us be broad and wise enough to say all things are ours; let us gratefully welcome all that the best present-day thinkers can give us. But, all said and done, what have any of them to set beside what the Christian faith does for the shipwrecked and the broken hearted, for the men and women whom, in one way or another, life has hit between the eyes?

A God of some sort there must be—so say most thinking men. But what is He like? A looker-on, an occasional intervener, a scarcely glorified eastern potentate; or a great first cause that is not even live enough to be any of these? How, in view of all that men have to fight against and live through, can there be any real alternative to the Christian conception of the God whose throne is the Cross, who shares the joys and sufferings of His children, who makes the ins and outs and ups and downs of human life His own? In every sense this Christian conception holds the field; and when the plain man says, 'If God is as good as Jesus, we are "all right,"' he has put into a homely phrase the secret by which our faith is the victory that overcomes the world.

And we ought to remember that the actual present range of this victory is wider than at first sight appears. We do well to be impressed by the conspicuous goodness and quality of many men who disavow any kind of faith, and who, if they submitted to a label at all, would style themselves agnostics. Perhaps these characters are somewhat apt to be used as a stage procession, the same illustrious examples being paraded again and again, thus conveying a misleading impression of their number and significance. Be this as it may, such men have the compulsory advantage of a heritage and an atmosphere impregnated with Christian ideas, even when formal Christian beliefs are rejected. This point, of signal importance, is strikingly illustrated in a passage in which Renan, as an old man, looked back to his earlier days of faith: 'I feel that in reality my existence is still governed by a faith which I no longer possess; for one of the peculiarities of faith is that its action does not cease with its disappearance. Grace survives, by mere force of habit, the living sensation of it which we have felt. In a mechanical kind of way we go on doing what we had before been doing in spirit and in truth. After Orpheus, when he had lost his ideal, was torn to pieces by the Thracian women, his lyre still repeated Eurydice's name.'

So, in many unsuspected ways, when no hand seems to be touching the instrument, the music of our faith weaves its spell and does its work. In politics, in social reform, in many phases of social and individual life, Christianity is exercising an influence none the less real for being unavowed. The Rotarian movement—one of the most welcome and hopeful signs of the times—has the Christian spirit for its gist and essence. The Masonic movement, which for many men is to all intents and purposes their church, owes all that is best in it to the same ultimate source. And, to an extent the ordinary person little suspects, our faith is the motive and life-blood of the philanthropic enterprises of our day.

This naturally brings us to another feature of the New Testament Church that is of great moment to us at the present time—the *remarkable variety of its membership*. There is no attempt to instal any one kind of experience as the norm through which everyone must pass; and, among the leaders and

among the rank and file, it is clear that room was found for many degrees and gradations of belief and hope. Here you have catholicity of the most authentic kind, the real thing, worthy of the name. And it so stares us in the face that there is no excuse for missing its significance.

The mystically and spiritually gifted; the plain man with no taste for theology and no aptitude for religious experience, but who does his best to follow Christ along the level of everyday life; more than this, the man with no thought of being a Christian or even of being religious, but who makes life a better thing for the troubled and the unfortunate—New Testament catholicity has room for all these. True, not many of our church meetings would feel easy as to admitting those in the last category. Yet, remembering what Christ said about them, how are they to be excluded from His fellowship?

It looks as though the Church of the present day is much less broad in its range and flexible in its thinking than the New Testament warrants. And our theology has thereby suffered greatly. We shall never properly clarify our thought and commend our faith to the average man until we frankly recognize that in religion there are many varieties of experience and many different ways of saying the same thing.

Let me take a crucial instance. It is often said that to-day we have not the same sense of sin that our fathers had. But is this quite so certain as is generally assumed? May we not be confusing words with realities? There is a certain order of mind that must explore the deeper reaches of this fathomless problem, dwelling on the awful mystery of evil and all that it means to live in disobedience to the will of God. To such minds the sinfulness of sin is more than a phrase: it is an almost intolerable darkness that hangs over their lives; and, so put, the sense of sin is indeed terribly real. Yet, after all, is it more real, more wholesomely deterring, than the attitude of the man to whom sin is simply and blankly selfishness, the putting of his own pleasure and gain before the good of his fellows; and whose notion of the antithesis of sin is just to be clean and straight and thoughtful for others? As it works out in everyday living, is not this latter view as healthy and effective as the other, and, moreover, is it not as authentically Christian?

And the further question may be asked, did this sense of sin which our fathers had produce anything to surpass the spirit of service and the wide range of practical Christianity, the sensitiveness to social wrong and common responsibility, which we can point to in the life of to-day? If all this is not the negation of sin and the embodiment of the Spirit of Christ, what is?

In justice to ourselves and to clarify our judgment, we may well reflect on certain types of character and outlook that flourished, with naïve sincerity, in the soil of that old-time sense of sin. There was, for example, Wilberforce, the most powerful of the Evangelicals in the sphere of politics. 'His is a most perplexing character . . . For example, he played a leading part in promoting the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800, which made illegal for a quarter of a century the only method by which the workers could improve their position, namely, the Trades Unions. And why? . . . because "the more lowly path of the poor has been appointed them by the hand of God, and it is their part faithfully to discharge its duties and contentedly to bear its inconveniences."'

Then, again, there is Hannah More. 'She was teaching in a Sunday School in a Mendip mining village where the wages were a shilling a day, and two hundred people were crammed into nineteen cottages. It never occurred to her that such a condition of life was a crying iniquity. She only deplored the immorality of the villagers, and comforted herself with the thought that the children understood tolerably well the first chapters of Genesis.'²

And do they not tell us that Newton composed 'How sweet the name of Jesus sounds' when on a slave-raiding expedition; and that, at other times, when engaged in this same traffic, he enjoyed 'a comfortable sense of the presence of God'?

We need not make too much of instances of this kind, but it is legitimate to recall them by way of correcting a tendency to misunderstand or under-estimate the religious feelings and expressions that are characteristic of our time. In particular, they ought to warn us against making too much of any particular form of religious experience. We are inviting unreality and

² Somervell.

deterring some of the best and most sincere people, unless we frankly recognize that there is much fine, healthy faith and Christian living to which stock religious phrases are a foreign tongue, and which cuts out its own path and creates its own experience. Especially if we shut our eyes to this, we may find ourselves hopelessly out of touch with many of our young people who are best worth winning.

The problem of what ought to be the criterion of Church Membership bristles with difficulties, on which we must all be keenly exercised. But, meanwhile, I am content to leave it at this: if we emulate the catholicity of the New Testament, we shall find it more and more of an anomaly to admit people into the Church because of their creed or profession or spiritual experience, while excluding those whose one claim is that they have the spirit of Christ and are trying to practise what there is apostolic authority for calling pure and undefiled religion.

There remains one other note of the Church created by New Testament Modernism—*its cheerfulness and high spirits*. It is not to be dismissed as accidental or unimportant that the words 'joy' and 'rejoice' occur over one hundred times in the New Testament. 'Nothing is so exhilarating as adventure, and these people felt they were out on a great spiritual adventure. Probably, Christian smiles and the Christian habit of laughing at misfortune won more converts than Christian arguments.' This is the warrantable judgment of Mr. Somervell, whose *Short History of Our Religion* has won such deserved appreciation.

Nor is there anything superficial or ostrich-like about the optimism of the New Testament. Modern realism has nothing more vividly disconcerting than certain passages in these first writers on our faith. They know the world and do not hesitate to face it. But with their own eyes they have seen the worst not only overcome, but made to feed the fires of the best; and so, again and again, they say 'rejoice.'

In their own personal lives many of them knew as much about trouble and suffering as any man can know. 'Troubled, perplexed, persecuted, cast down'—an impressive inventory; a big load for one back to carry. Yet there is no despair or giving in. 'We faint not.'

Of course, neither St. Paul nor his followers were always on

that level. Plainly enough, things were sometimes on top of them; and there were 'thorns in the flesh' to remind them that God exacts a heavy toll of the man who would journey to and from the third heaven. But the frank confession that they were sometimes nearly beaten brings into relief the major fact that they often came out 'more than conquerors.'

Yes, the New Testament life is brave and buoyant and happy; in ominous contrast with the drab pedestrianism which is our prevailing note. Is there no help for it? Must we go on like *this* and never know how they went on like *that*? Having their faith, why should we not have their joy? We are on the way to having it when we realize that, in this day of strain and depression, the Church ought to be the great encourager. The unpardonable sin is to depress the people who come under our influence. Not that worship can uniformly be a thing of high spirits. There is nothing more abysmally depressing, especially in religion, than joy made to order and artificially kept alive.

Here is an illustration from real life that puts the case in a nutshell. Recently I heard a member of one of our churches describe the difference between two ministers of high repute, to both of whom he had listened with profit. Each, he explained, had a habit of knocking you down by his preaching; but, whereas one always picked you up again, the other invariably left you lying down. You scarcely want it put more clearly than that. Where there is true preaching there must be a good deal of knocking down, but only as preliminary to a fine, hopeful picking up.

There is a saying of Christ's that, whatever its technical exegesis, strikes in here with great suggestiveness. 'Whosoever shall say to his brother, "thou fool," shall be in danger . . . ' Obviously, that must mean more than the bursting through of momentary temper or irritation: that is too slender to make fuel for hell. But there is a way of calling a man a fool which goes much further than that. The word itself may not be named; but, by what you say or leave unsaid, you may damp a man's spirits, cloud his ideals, make him feel that his hopes are moonshine and his strength as nothingness. The fire thus stolen from a brother's altar will burn the thief—why and how

should it be otherwise? And it is the sort of thing our services and our sermons must never do.

The old lady in one of Mr. Bernard Shaw's plays who exclaims with genial zest, 'Of course we're all miserable sinners—that's religion,' represents a type that appears in many guises; but she ought not to represent *us*. Where she and her kind go wrong is in putting a full stop where the New Testament only allows a comma. By all means the fear of the Lord, which is the beginning of wisdom and health and happiness; but not the fear which disheartens and paralyses and takes the life out of a man.

Nowadays every man has a hard battle, and many are fighting against heavy odds. There is something for wonder in the quiet courage and indomitable cheerfulness of numbers of our business people in this time of prolonged depression and strain; and our churches abound in men and women whom life is putting to all manner of severe tests, and who, in spite of all, are not unworthy emulators of the New Testament spirit.

On so many sides, within and without the Church, there is much in ordinary daily life to feed our faith in human nature. What a fight it is making: how hard it is trying to be happy, as God meant it to be! Can we not help it? Let the Church of Christ make resolute war on all needless depression. Let men feel that when they share our worship and listen to our preaching, life is made more worth while, courage returns, and the sun comes out again. Let us be channels through which there may come to the men of our day the ancient blessing—'the joy of the Lord is your strength.'

Thus I have tried to use the opportunity your generous trust has given me. The commanding of agreement with all I have said is of subsidiary moment. Honest speaking and honest listening make their own pact, and the ultimate result cannot be other than good. My hope is that, because of what I have attempted, my brother ministers everywhere may feel their way open to a fuller and happier liberty of utterance; that men in lonely or difficult places may be stimulated and heartened; that we all, ministers and laity alike, may take a greater pride in our Church, and do our hopeful best to bring it nearer to the ideal of 'a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle or any such thing.'

THE PROBLEM OF INTELLIGENT FAITH*

By Dr. CYRIL NORWOOD, Master of Marlborough College.

THE time that can be allowed to each of the speakers is short, and the problem with which I have to deal is vast; for I suppose that all the volumes devoted to the exposition of theology and religion which are poured out year by year are devoted to some aspect of our subject, and I cannot hope this evening to touch upon more than one or two.

It is important, if I am not to be obscure, to make clear what I mean by Faith, and I think that I am not far from the general meaning given to the word in the New Testament, when I say that I understand by it everything that enters into the voluntary acceptance by each human spirit of Jesus as Son of God and Saviour of the world. It is therefore not an act of reason pure and simple, not an act only of intelligence. It includes not only that, but my will and my affections too; it is an affirmation made by my whole self, or it should be. And the problem that vexes so many in this modern world is that they do not see their way to affirm with their whole selves; for either their mind is willing, and their heart is cold, or, more often, their heart is willing, but the faith presents itself in such a way to them that it seems either based on bad history, or contrary to scientific knowledge. And many take refuge at best in what one may call an irrational mysticism, 'faintly trusting the larger hope,' and others fall back into the tolerant agnosticism which is so prevalent among educated men to-day.

We must not be unreasonable in our demands; we must not expect to receive a map of the unknown, a precise description of futurity, an explanation of all that is obscure. 'Faith,' said the writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews, 'is the substance of things hoped for, the test of things not seen.' It deals with the future and the invisible. It is not a mere bet that of two or more possible interpretations one is most likely to be right. By

* A paper read before the Oxford Church Congress.

observation, for instance, we establish a law, and by faith we hold that it will be permanent and universal. By observation again we note the evidence of design, forethought, and love in the governing of the world, and by faith we hold that love is to be the true law of life. So there is intellectual inference in it, but there is always more. Nor can we ever get away from the fact that we have our portion in both worlds, and, as has been well said, are not secure of either. We touch both the unseen and the seen, the transitory and the eternal. We cannot be content with the former save by the sacrifice or the starvation of what we feel to be the highest part of us; and we cannot often or altogether attain to the latter in the conditions of this life.

It is therefore idle for us to demand the impossible, to demand, as some seem to do, that the faith should show us all things to come, all things invisible. But it is a fair demand that our faith should not be irrational, should not introduce a division into our personality by asking us to accept on authority things contrary to knowledge, thereby preventing all growth and development. It is because the Christian faith, as it has been presented, has seemed to do this, that our troubles have arisen. If our faith has come to be thought unintelligent, it would be well to ask why. The reasons, as it seem to me, arise partly from a temporary phase of thought, but, in part they come from just criticisms of some presentations of Christianity, in which the unessential is inextricably mixed with the essential. I will try to deal briefly with both.

The temporary reasons for regarding Faith as unintelligent seem to be bound up with a science and a philosophy dominant in the nineteenth century, but now passed, or passing away. When Kant laid down that the truths of science are objectively certain, and that the truths of morality and religion are matters of subjective faith, there can be no doubt that for many thinkers who followed him he placed the truths of physical science on an altogether superior plane to other facts of human experience. And in our own country Herbert Spencer, the fashionable philosopher of a generation of scientists, divided the universe into the knowable and the unknowable, claiming the former for science, and relegating religion entirely to the latter. Hence

arose the cocksureness of so much nineteenth century scientific philosophy, that annoying and unsatisfying attitude so often adopted that what the writer does not know isn't knowledge. They took an abstract view of reality, and assumed it to be the whole; they took a limited field, and relegated all outside its borders to the realms of dream and imagination. They made little attempt to answer the over-insistent human questions of whence and whither, but offered us merely a nebula as our origin, and stark cold and deadness for our terminus. Some were further good enough to explain us to ourselves as cunning elaborations of mechanism, and our consciousness as an epiphenomenon, so that we were in Tennyson's phrase 'magnetic mockeries.' But I could never help agreeing with Tennyson's comment, that, if we are only 'cunning casts in clay,'

' Let Science prove we are, and then
What matters Science unto men? '

There was no resting-place for the human spirit here, for too much of human experience was excluded from consideration. And apart from that science has ceased to be cocksure. I read, and I am told, that in general scientists have ceased to believe that the organic can be wholly explained by the inorganic, or that all the phenomena of biology can be explained by chemistry and physics. If modern evolutionists, following Lamarck, are winning acceptance for their belief that a sense of need, and an effort to satisfy that need on the challenge of the environment, result in organic change, then there lies no uncrossable gulf between them and those for whom their religion is a feeling after God, if haply they might find Him, who believe that in the conscious striving of individual wills has lain the progress of humanity.

The change of attitude which has taken place is well illustrated by the difference between the certainty with which thirty years ago all miracles were denied as impossible, and the humbler and less absolute tone which is now generally adopted. I do not myself regard the truth of Christianity as dependent on the historical exactitude of the miracle-narratives of the New Testament. But we know so much more clearly than our fathers did how extensive is the command of mind over matter, how great and strange are the workings of the will and of spiritual

power, that few would be prepared to dogmatize as to what might or might not have happened when human beings were in the presence of what on the lowest estimate was a will and a nature of the utmost purity and integrity. The incidents which are narrated may seem to be contrary to nature as we know it, but it would be hazardous to assert that they are contrary to nature as we may come to know it.

If I were asked what is the central affirmation of my faith, I would answer that it is that Christ Jesus came into the world to save sinners, or in the form that the Word became flesh, and dwelt among us; and I would claim that there is nothing contrary to reason or the intelligence in affirming that central truth. There is so far as I know nothing in the established truths of modern science which I am unable to accept. I look on this world about me as having through almost measureless spaces of time been made gradually fit for the maintenance of life, and at the right time I realize that life appeared, at first in the very humblest of forms; I recognize again a further process of age-long development by which life became more complex and more individual, until man appeared in a form recognizable as man; I trace again a much shorter development, but still very much longer than by tradition we had come to believe, whereby man developed to the point which he had reached two thousand years ago. And then in the fullness of time the Word became flesh, and Jesus of Nazareth lived upon earth—not at the end of the process, but during the course of man's development, simply because in human evolution character is transformed by its own ideal, and therefore the ideal must be presented before the development can begin. Jesus Christ is, above all, as He declared Himself to be, the Way, the Truth, and the Life, and only by following the Way can humanity become what it is capable of becoming in this life or beyond.

We have on the one hand ample historical evidence that Jesus did so come, and that such a life was lived. And I would ask you to notice that though critical methods are applied to the Gospel narratives, and clever theories are advanced, as for instance that Jesus was merely a Jewish peasant self-deluded by an expectation of a catastrophic end of the world and a

coming in glory, ideas current at the time, yet I would have you notice that none of these reconstructions have carried conviction, because I think they explain some, but never all, of the facts. The central Figure resists these processes of explaining away, for there is always more there than the critics can account for. Whether we study the truth of what He said, or the power of what He did, or the purity and influence of the life, in which nothing was attempted or done according to worldly standards, the record remains unique, to me unintelligible save on the presupposition of my faith, that Christ Jesus was both human and divine.

To that historic evidence which cannot be explained away we have to add the testimony of experience of all those who in the successive generations since elapsed have accepted Jesus Christ, and found Him living and present. That testimony does not come from the members of any particular Church; it comes from members of all the Churches. This is to me the strongest evidence of all, and it seems to me a poor sort of criticism which waves aside this overwhelming mass of evidences from men and women of very different types, ages and nationalities as all instances of self-deception. Such critics seem like those who shut their eyes to the field of vision, and say that it does not exist, merely because they will not look and examine.

At the same time, to turn rather late to the other side of my topic, I am concerned to-night only to try to demonstrate that it is possible to hold the Christian Faith intelligently, but I am not denying that it is possible to hold that faith unintelligently. The central truth is a truth of all time and all existence, but men mistake for that central truth interpretations which are of a time only. I hold it unintelligent to think to-day that Christianity requires us to believe that man was created a fixed and in a way a finished type, some six thousand years ago, and that he fell from a state of innocence in order to enable God to show His love for man by the sacrifice of His Son; I hold it unintelligent to believe in a precisely mapped-out purgatory, and a local heaven above us, and a local hell beneath, when we know that this earth is but a speck of dust in an infinite universe; I hold it unintelligent to believe in the verbal inspiration of the Biblical record, whether it be Old Testament or New,

when it is so patent that it was composed as other books are, and when, as I think, the truths which it reveals become so much more arresting and compelling, so much more intelligible, when the writings are studied reverently and critically. Not one of these beliefs, which were all natural once, now does anything but hinder the spread of true Christianity, and men ought to remember that reason and logic are faculties as divinely implanted in us as in any other, and we ought not to be afraid of their use.

I do not want to seem hard or impatient, and I sympathize with those whose faith is disturbed when what they have considered to be a spiritual resting-place is abandoned to decay. But I do not think that those who really know Christ are shaken from their faith when unessential supports are taken away from them. I believe rather that those who are shaken have never of themselves known Christ, but have been living on tradition and authority and things external. And there must always be crudities in our human presentation of eternal truths; we can never present God to ourselves save through symbols and imperfect pictures while we are still in the body and in this world of sense. To Him our highest wisdom must be childishness.

And so I come back to the point from which I started, that our faith is more than intellectual, more than a series of logical inferences; it is an affirmation of our whole selves, and binds up together our wills, our affections, our reason. They that follow the Way shall know of the Way, and certainty comes by no other method than by living the life. But to those that do so there comes the revelation according to their worthiness that God is love, and in that illumination which suffuses all their being they are content for this life to see as in a glass darkly. Intellectual difficulties sink in importance, and the essence is seen to be not purely intellectual at all. It becomes clear what Jesus meant when He said, 'I thank Thee, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, that Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes; even so, Father, for so it seemed good in Thy sight.'

BENEDICT DE SPINOZA (1632-1677)

By the Rev. JOHN GAMBLE, B.D., Canon Residentiary of Bristol.

Dr. Roth does more in his recent book¹ than his title might suggest. While he establishes Spinoza's independence of Descartes, and indicates his many points of contact with Maimonides, he at the same time elucidates Spinoza's own system, and helps his readers to understand the great Jewish thinker. His book is singularly free from technical language, and he would perhaps agree with Hume that philosophy may be written without the aid of a special vocabulary. His work has thus an interest not only for professed students of philosophy, but for the increasing circle of readers who, for their own edification, desire to become better acquainted with Spinoza.

It is not difficult to account for Spinoza's ever-widening influence, or for the peculiar fascination he exercises upon his readers. The disinterestedness of the philosopher imparts itself to us as we follow his intellectual progress. His conception of the universe is not only an intellectual achievement of singular elevation and comprehensiveness. The conception, by its inherent power, creates an attitude towards the world, and a way of life, which go far to establish its truth. Of all modern philosophers the most religious in temper and aim is he who, for half a century after his death, was regarded by the majority of those who heeded him at all as an atheist. His philosophy was not the result of an intellectual curiosity, or of a desire for literary fame—in no life is personal ambition less noticeable than in that of Spinoza—it grew in his mind in response to the calls of his own experience. A member of a family of Portuguese Jews, who had settled in Amsterdam to escape from the Inquisition, he began his studies in the Jewish school of that city, with the intention, apparently, of becoming a Rabbi. The Jewish Scriptures confronted him at once with the questions: What is a Divine Revelation? and Who is the

¹ *Spinoza, Descartes and Maimonides*, by Leon Roth, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxford University Press, 1923.)

Revealer? From the outset, he tells us, his studies were directed towards the practical end of discovering a religious sanction for human conduct. His desire was to find a way of life by which men could reach the happiness they all sought, but which very few of them succeeded in finding.

‘After experience had taught me that the common occurrences of life were vain and futile, and I saw that all the objects of my desire and fear were in themselves neither good nor bad, save in so far as my mind was affected by them; I at length determined to search out whether there were not something truly good and communicable to man, by which his spirit might be affected to the exclusion of all other things; yea, whether there were anything, through the discovery and acquisition of which I might enjoy continuous and perfect gladness for ever.’²

We thus see him intent, not merely upon answering his own questions, but upon the attainment of what in religious language is known as ‘salvation,’ the harmony of his whole being, body, soul and spirit, with the Divine Will. He goes on to say that the very search for such an object turned his mind away from the things commonly prized as the greatest goods—riches, fame and lust—and lessened the attractiveness of these illusory satisfactions.

We are consequently not surprised that Spinoza should have given to the fullest and final exposition of his philosophy the form of a treatise on Ethics.³ The Ethics appear to have been begun at least ten years before Spinoza’s death, and their composition to have been interrupted to make room for the other great treatise, *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (Roth, p. 63).

The two works, taken together, make it probable that Spinoza began as a theologian, and ended as a philosopher.

‘He did not,’ says Pollock,⁴ ‘simply break off from theological

² *On the Amendment of the Understanding*. Quoted by Dr. Bridges in *The Spirit of Man*.

³ The *Ethics* of Spinoza were first published in 1677, some months after his death. The best-known English translation is that of W. Hale White (the author of *Mark Rutherford’s Autobiography*), which appeared in 1883 and is now in its fourth edition. A writer in the *Chronicon Spinozanum*, 1922, says that the several editions bear witness to White as a scholar exact, unwearied, and constant in the study of Spinoza. I know of no good English translation of the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*. The complete works of Spinoza have been translated into German by Auerbach, a version which has none of the stiffness of a translation, although it keeps most closely to the original.

⁴ *Spinoza, His Life and Philosophy*, Ed. 1912, p. 155. Quoted by Dr. Roth, p. 51.

speculation and seek to establish philosophy on an independent footing : he seems intent on showing that theological speculation itself, when reason is once allowed free play, must at last purge itself of anthropomorphism, and come round to the scientific view. Spinoza does not ignore theology, but provides an *euthanasia* for it; and there is every reason to believe that in so doing he faithfully reproduces the development of his own mind.'

Studying the Jewish Scriptures he saw at once the pitfall which besets all speculations about the Divine Being. God in these Scriptures is assumed to be 'above' or apart from the world, and is pictured after a human likeness. The sacred writers do, it is true, show themselves aware of the dangers they thus run, and remind their readers that God is not 'a man who can lie' or 'the son of man who can repent,' that He is invisible and unapproachable (e.g. *Ex.* xxxiv. 23, *Is.* lxxv. 9). None the less does the anthropomorphic tendency assert itself from Genesis to Malachi.

Spinoza saw that the Infinite Being could not be thus represented. Man's vision of God can only be partial. He can see only what his limited nature enables him to see of the Divine Nature. His limitations restrict him to two out of an infinity of Divine attributes. God reveals Himself—or, in other words, the conception of God is conveyed—by two avenues, that of extension and that of thought. We reach the conception as we observe the transformation of what we call 'matter,' and also as we follow the operations of our own minds. God has an infinity of other attributes, but these two are the only ones within our reach.

The consequences of this principle are vital and far-reaching. Instead of picturing God as existing apart from the world, we are invited to examine the processes, material, and spiritual, in which He expresses Himself.⁵ Instead of trying to reach Him by the pictorial imagination, we are called upon to follow the paths along which He walks. Instead of fancying that our knowledge of Him is complete, we are taught that such knowledge is and will always be partial, but that it is capable of indefinite growth.⁶

⁵ The reader will of course remember that, when Spinoza speaks of God as 'He' or 'Him,' he is merely following traditional usage.

⁶ The truth here indicated receives religious expression in the first chapter of the *Theologia Germanica*, a small pre-Reformation treatise to which Luther professed himself greatly indebted.

No great writer has been more seriously misrepresented than Spinoza. He has been supposed to have identified God with the world in such a way that stocks and stones might be regarded as fragments of the Divine Being. It was not, however, the world which Spinoza identified with God, but the understanding which pervades the world and which we are able to recognize by a like faculty within ourselves. 'The identity of God with nature is for Spinoza His identity with that in nature which is essentially intelligible, extension and thought.'

The moral effects of Spinoza's principle are equally noteworthy. To suppose that whatever is, is the work of God is to make Him responsible for what we call 'evil,' as well as for what we call 'good.' It may thus seem impossible for us to blame even the worst malefactors because they have their legitimate places in the Divine economy. This difficulty Spinoza did not evade. He held that while righteous men do the will of God consciously, transgressors do His will without knowing what they do. *Bonos fata ducunt, malos trahunt.* Human actions, whether we pronounce them to be good or evil, do both fall within the Divine intention (e.g. the treachery of Judas and the vacillation of Pilate). None the less do the good deeds distinguish themselves unmistakeably from the bad ones. If bad actions affect our fellow-men they rightly call for social condemnation and punishment. If they affect the culprit alone they weaken his power by depriving him of that joy which is an invariable accompaniment of the knowledge and the love of God. Should it be urged that the Divine Nature is thus sullied since God cannot be supposed to blame actions which He calls for, Spinoza answers that if by blame be meant 'anger,' we cannot attribute this human feeling to God. To do so would be to make Him a partaker of the 'sorrow' involved in human emotion. He also replies that to ask God to dispense with evil, or to make men such that evil would be impossible, would be to make the impious suggestion that He should do otherwise than He has actually done.

The universe is thus for Spinoza strictly 'monistic,' and forms one system. He differs markedly in this respect, as Dr. Roth conclusively shows, from his predecessor Descartes, for

⁷ Victor Delbos : *Chron. Spin.* 1922, xv.

whom the world-order might at any moment be broken up by the action of God, and human knowledge thus reduced to chaos.

'Everything, in Descartes' view, rests on and in the will of God, whose judgements surpass the grasp of the human understanding. There are no necessary connexions between things, because there is no necessity; nor can we speak of causation in a world in which God is the sole and immediate cause of everything. . . . Qualities may conceivably be changed within the substance, and substances themselves may conceivably interchange with one another. To deny these possibilities is to deny the divine power. That we cannot understand them is no argument, because the understanding of man is incompetent to fathom the nature and purposes of God.'⁸

Such theories appeared to Spinoza to lead directly to atheism. They split up the universe into a number of heterogeneous spheres. They create a false supernatural which might at any time reverse the existing order, and paralyse human thought. In Spinoza's judgment Descartes, by pronouncing man to be incompetent to fathom the nature and purposes of God, stereotyped existing beliefs, however untenable they might be, and blocked the way to a nearer approach to truth and to God.

We thus learn to appreciate the religious value of Spinoza's philosophy. Instead of representing God as remote and inaccessible, it brings Him near by teaching us to regard everything that is as 'in Him,' contained within His life, and expressive of His will. It leads us to think of everything that happens as happening of necessity. A 'miracle,' in the sense of a direct intervention of God, would imply that the world-order was bad and needed mending. A wish for a different order would indicate a supposition that we were wiser than He from Whom alone we can learn what wisdom is. Contingency in the universe would imply that the Eternal Being was ignorant of the future.

Spinoza hoped, as we have seen, that his studies might lead him to discoveries and acquisitions in which he should find 'continuous and perfect gladness for ever.' The hope might suggest that he looked for a life after death into which he might carry the surpassing treasures he had here accumulated. It does not appear, however, that he had any such anticipations. For him the source of all error and sin was to be found in the

⁸ Roth, p. 28.

tendency to treat our own necessarily partial views as if they were complete, to regard the pictures of the imagination as valid likenesses of eternal things, to forget that 'when that which is perfect is come, then that which is in part shall be done away.' These 'anthropomorphisms' created the conception of God which he found in the Old Testament, and which he tried in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* to correct. They created a god who could change his mind, who allowed himself to be thwarted by his creatures, who bound himself by 'covenants' to particular nations, who could change wrong into right, and falsehood into truth, by his arbitrary *fiat*. The popular ideas of immortality were to Spinoza perpetuations of this error. An immortality which involved the prolongation of the finite self could for him, as Dr. Roth says,⁹ have no meaning. It was the negation of the very perfection which it was supposed to realize. To be immortal was for Spinoza to live 'in the whole'—Goethe's: *im Ganzen, Guten, Schönen, resolut zu leben*—and thus to escape from the burden of sin and death laid upon us by the individual self. Such immortality might, he thought, in moments of exceptional insight become an actual experience, and the soul feel itself to be beyond the fear or even the thought of death. Even if we admit such a possibility, however, we find it hard to suppose that such spiritual exaltation will ever be accepted by ordinary men as an equivalent for the 'future life' they desire.

Many indications show that Spinoza is as yet only at the beginning of his reign. Numerous writings, of which Dr. Roth's lucid volume is the latest, bear witness to the depth of Spinoza's insight and the growth of his authority. Yet he claimed no finality for his speculations, and his warmest admirers know that his philosophy, in spite of its elevation and disinterestedness, does yet lack 'a clear idea, a quick sentiment of what can be effected by purely human action.'¹⁰ He has, however, many illustrious disciples, such as Goethe and Emerson, who show us how consistent his teachings are with a wholesome belief in the power of human effort, and a hopeful outlook towards the future of humanity.

⁹ P. 123.

¹⁰ Victor Delbos.

THE VOICE IN THE WILDERNESS

A STRANGER paused at the flagged pathway leading under pollard limes off the main street of the little country town to the old grey church whose bells were reiterating their insistent call from the massive Norman tower. Seeing an elderly citizen approaching, he ascertained that this was St. John's, and remarked, as they walked on together, 'It seems to be a very fine old church.' 'Yes,' replied the other, 'but it is very poorly attended nowadays.' 'That is a pity,' returned the stranger, in a tone that invited further information, and his companion responded, 'Yes, there are a good many chapels in the town, and three churches, and the people don't come here as they used to do.'

This ended the conversation, for they reached the church, and the stranger was ushered by a cassocked verger to a seat near the beautiful Norman arch, through which a numerous surpliced choir presently proceeded to the stalls under the tower.

It was the first Sunday in the month, and the visitor found himself thinking of similar Sundays, some fifty years past, when he had walked two long miles with his parents to the old church where unabbreviated Matins had preceded the sermon and ante-Communion Service, after which he and his sisters had been released to await their elders in a neighbouring garden. Things are made easier nowadays, both for adults and children, and on this occasion the 'Wherefore I pray and beseech you' followed immediately on the opening sentence, while the *Venite* and the Apostles' Creed were also omitted. The stranger noticed, moreover, and interpreted with some sympathy as denoting a desire on the part of the officiating clergyman to avoid the banal and mechanical in his delivery of the familiar words, and to keep alive the attention and interest of his hearers, a colloquial style and tone of voice which struck him as pathetic, because so unsuccessful. He also felt depressed by the evident desire of the organist to infuse feeling and expression into the singing of chants and hymn-tunes, almost all of the type that

invites a sentimental rendering completely alien to the dignity and virile poetry of psalms and canticles, however closely akin to the style of the hymns chosen.

Having himself had some experience in choir-training, the stranger knew the difficulties that have to be met on this ground—the predilection in choirs and congregations for the sentimental in church music, for long drawn-out diminuendos and rallentandos in responses and kyries, and the fierce opposition to the introduction of new and less enervating tunes for familiar words—the clinging to all that tends to the automatic and mechanical and renders unnecessary concentration and effort on the part of singers who genuinely believe the ‘expression’ in which they are indulging to be what is required to produce an artistic and worthy effect.

It was, however, during the ante-Communion Service that he suddenly became aware of all that had been more or less unconsciously passing through his mind; for this man had not come to church desiring to criticise, but to praise and pray, and had been faithfully endeavouring to do both from his heart, without dwelling on conditions that were a hindrance, although intended to be a help.

Struck afresh by the immense solemnity and grandeur of the first Commandments, he was reflecting that nothing short of genius could inspire a truly adequate delivery; and while still thus musing, he heard the sixth given out in the same conversational tone of voice, which now forced him to say to himself, ‘These might be the rules of a debating society, and yet murder and adultery are *not* obsolete; theft is daily committed.’

At this moment his eyes fell on the red-bound prayer-book before him, whereon, stamped in gilt lettering, he read, ‘Church of St. John the Baptist.’

He had but recently returned from Florence, visited for the first time. Among the vivid impressions crowding his memory one of the strongest was that of the Baptist of Donatello, who was so possessed by his conception of that extraordinary personality that he must needs portray it at every age, and has left us the most forcible presentment of an ardent spirit that has burnt away, it seems, all save the voice that, crying in the wilderness, compelled men and women to leave their concerns

and follow to the desert; that woke them out of the commonplace ways of everyday life and lit in their drowsy souls something of the flame that consumed himself. How would *he* have declaimed these Commandments? how have bidden the people to fall on their knees and beg for mercy? What would be the impression made on the Forerunner by the service conducted in this church dedicated to his name and memory?

These questions struck so vividly the imagination of the stranger that he almost felt as though the vision of that ascetic form with the burning eyes and the compelling voice must become perceptible to those around him as it appeared to himself. But such things do not happen, and the final *kyrie*, sung to a suave and gentle melody, died *diminuendo* and *rallentando* away.

The stranger pondered over all this as he walked the two miles that separated the little town from the village in which he was staying, and his reflections took somewhat this shape :

In thousands of churches all over the country had been said that morning by thousands of priests the same well-known words, and to congregations to whom they were little less familiar. How immense is the difficulty of keeping alive the spirit in the ancient forms, how almost inevitable the tendency to fall back upon a forced and unnatural manner, such as the colloquial tone adopted that morning, in order to galvanize the dead words into a semblance of vitality—an expedient almost more pathetic than the drowsy monotony to which others resign themselves. The alternative chosen by Nonconformists, prayer extemporized by men who may be devoid of any inspiration as to matter or manner of the petitions they must proffer, is one which few could face, even did it not imply the abandoning of words full of literary beauty which have all the added value of association and tradition.

A similar problem has to be faced by the actor who plays the same part day after day, but he has at any rate the dramatic action and movement of the play, and the stimulating influence of dialogue, to help him; also, what should surely be part of the equipment of every priest, the training in elocution and diction without which no one embarks on the theatrical profession. It is no less necessary for men who have to speak in

buildings that are often very defective acoustically, and who have certainly no less incentive than the actor to make their message intelligible and vitally interesting to their auditors. Yet many a devout church-goer finds a serious hindrance in the indistinct or even inaudible delivery of the officiating priest, and in the too often soulless, insignificant rendering of words that have rare literary beauty and often great dramatic force.

There is surely a potential artist slumbering in many a parish priest; could he be awakened, services that are dead-alive would become the source of vitalizing force and soul-refreshment that they are intended to be.

At this point, the stranger recalled a book on the Art of Singing that he had once read, and that had left him deeply impressed by the conviction of the writer—the admirable singer and artist, Frangçon Davies—that if the mind of a singer be wholly concentrated on the actual significance of the words he is singing, tone-production, enunciation and expressive rendering will all come spontaneously, *and will be right*. He then bethought him of a case in point, an occasion on which he had heard the lesson on charity read, by a lay member of the congregation in a little country church, with such poignant and heart-felt sincerity that the effect was simply startling and unforgettable; of another occasion when he had been almost equally startled, in a London church justly famed for its beautiful music, by the utterly inappropriate and meaningless rendering of the last verse of an otherwise exquisitely sung *Venite*; this stern and terrible sentence being accompanied by the conventional and inartistic *diminuendo* and *rallentando* which had that morning so oppressed him, and which must be impossible were the intelligence of the choir awakened to realize what they were singing.

A choir-trainer who believes that the sole purport of his work is to render more vivid the sense of the text sung; who will point out to his singers the significant words in each verse; and who can get them to concentrate on the idea conveyed by these, will find colour and meaning flow back into the dried-up channels, and the worn-out words will live again.

The opening verse of the *Venite*, ‘O come, let us sing, let us heartily rejoice!’ is a call to all present to join in a shout of

joy, but it does not always give this impression. In the following verse, let the choir concentrate their thought on the one word 'glad,' and see whether gladness will not flow out into their voices. The remedy is the same for words read or spoken, and it is a real remedy, springing from the depths of the soul, no artificial makeshift exteriorly applied.

But it is for him who has a spark of the interior fire, said the stranger to himself as he re-entered the old timbered house in the village street which was his temporary home, to kindle it in those with whom he has to do. No one is free from the obligation to seize and transmit such faint echo as he can catch of the voices that have cried in the wilderness—voices of men whose inspired genius gave their words a vital force they seem to have lost for some to-day. For there is a strange and inexhaustible virtue in words. If they be used with intention (that is to say, with intense realization of their meaning), they will not grow stale and lose flavour, but will on the contrary become more and more pregnant with vitality and significance. It is a literal truth that in the Word is Life, and it is the key to the invincible power of poetry over the soul of man—a power which none can afford to ignore or neglect whose business it is to train men in the service of Him Who spake by the prophets.

M. F. BROMLEY-MARTIN.

BOOK REVIEWS

ANCIENT HERESY AND MODERN THEOLOGY*

Christ and His apostles are not, taken alone and in themselves, a sufficient cause of the complex phenomenon of the Christian Church. The primitive community was a group within Judaism: it was transformed into a world-wide and predominantly Gentile society. This process inevitably involved the Church with ideas and institutions already established in Europe. The Church came with a new and a distinctive message, but it could only live by speaking the language and, in some degree, appropriating the ideas of the age. Among the most potent of the forces which the Church thus encountered was the philosophical thought of Greece. The originators of Greek thought had belonged to an earlier world, but their influence lived on. At the time of the rise of Christianity in Europe a popular Stoicism, tempered with Platonism, was widespread, and the metaphysical conception of an absolute and unchanging Being

* *Apollinarianism: An Essay on the Christology of the Early Church.* By CHARLES E. RAVEN, D.D. (Cambridge University Press, 1923; 12/6.)

was early taken over by Christian theologians. An 'absolute' philosophy is always hard put to it to account for the existence of the changing world of sense-perception. The earlier Stoicism had been pantheistic, and had spoken of Logos or Reason immanent in the world. When the transcendental Platonic conception of the divine re-asserted itself, the Logos tended to become a force intermediate between God and the world. Philo had used the concept of the Logos to express the organ of God's revelation, and Greek Christians followed the same line of thought. Jesus Christ, they said, was the personal incarnation of that Logos which had inspired the Hebrew prophets, and which had been partially revealed, as Justin teaches, to devout heathen too. Thus Greek metaphysics influenced the Church's doctrine both of God and of His Incarnate Son.

Dr. Raven's book is not only the completest examination in English of Apollinarian doctrine, it is also an Essay on the whole development of Christological doctrine in the early Church. The author is learned in his subject; he is also an able and an attractive writer. Apollinarius is Dr. Raven's hero: Apollinarianism, both in its ancient and its modern forms, is to him the most dangerous of heresies. 'Apollinarius was simply the boldest and most logical exponent of a doctrine that can be traced back at least to Justin Martyr, and is characteristic of the greatest saints and thinkers of the early Church.' Yet 'the result of this doctrine is docetic: there has been no real union of God and Man.' And 'the cause of this failure is due to the fundamental weakness of the concept of God from which Greek Christendom started its theological thought' (p. 274).

Dr. Raven's treatment is primarily historical. It is only occasionally that he indicates his own standpoint. These hints are important, for the author's own attitude necessarily and rightly influences his presentation and his estimate of the history. At times indeed Dr. Raven does, I think, fall into the temptation of ascribing modern ways of thought to ancients with whom he is in sympathy. Thus there is a post-Kantian ring about the attitude which he ascribes to simple Christians untouched by the speculations of the Greeks. They held, he says, that 'Jesus stood in a unique relationship to God and had the value of God for mankind' (p. 42). Again, it is surely a modern, not an ancient Christian, still less an 'unsophisticated' ancient Christian who acclaims Jesus as Saviour and Son of God 'in virtue of His *experience* (italics mine) of the reality of His resurrection.' A Christian of the third century, I imagine, read the Gospels, and believed what he read. Again, Dr. Raven's sympathy with Theodore has, surely, betrayed him into mistranslation. Speaking of Theodore's conception of the relation of God to Man, he says, 'Between God and His saints there is a *mutual* goodwill, an affection to which Theodore gives the characteristic word *εὐδοκία*' (italics mine) (p. 286). And again, '*εὐδοκία* to [Theodore] means "love"' (p. 302). This seems very questionable. *εὐδοκία* means 'approval' or 'goodwill,' and thus is a natural term to use of God's attitude to a saint. Is there any instance in which *εὐδοκία* is used of man's attitude to God?

But we return to the main subject of the book. Apollinarius denied the complete humanity of Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ was not a man: He was the Logos, who assumed a human soul and body. In Jesus the Logos took the place of the human spirit. This Christology was not essentially new. Greek Christianity had from early times regarded Jesus Christ as the Logos in a human form. But the earlier Greek theologians had definitely subordinated the Logos to God, and had treated Jesus as

the complete embodiment of a mediating power which was present to some extent in all men. Hence, 'regarding God as unknowable, impassible, super-essential, a dilemma confronted them: either the Logos like ourselves is passible, in which case *ex hypothesi* He cannot be divine—which is Arianism; or He is impassible and therefore not man at all—which, disguise it as you will, is Gnosticism' (p. 37). Apollinarius had defended, with Athanasius, the Nicene doctrine of the consubstantiality of the Son. This doctrine necessarily weakened the conception of the λόγος σπερματικός which allowed for analogy between the Incarnation in Jesus Christ, and other manifestations of the Divine. Dorner, followed by Gwatkin and other writers, attributed an analogous conception to Apollinarius. Apollinarius, says Dorner, held that the Logos replaced in Jesus Christ the human spirit, but that the Logos was Himself archetypal Man. But Dr. Raven follows Lietzmann and Bethune Baker in rejecting Dorner's view. It is not supported by the evidence, and it would be out of harmony with Apollinarius's thought. 'A man deriving energy from God,' said Apollinarius, 'is not God, but a body conjoined with God is God: so Christ is not a man receiving energy from God, but a body compacted with God.' Again: 'If the Lord is not incarnate, He would be wisdom illuminating the heart of a man: but this is present in all men' (quoted by Dr. Raven, p. 180).

Apollinarius was condemned, but, as Dr. Raven shows, his influence on subsequent Christological thought from Cyril of Alexandria to Bishop Gore, has been persistent. The Church which condemned him appropriated the essential points in his Christology—the doctrines of *kenosis* and of *communicatio idiomatum*. It is difficult too not to follow Dr. Raven when he argues that, in spite of the verbal repudiation of Apollinarianism, the orthodox doctrine of the impersonal humanity does not differ essentially from the traditional Greek view which Apollinarius carried through to its logical conclusion.

But the Greek tradition was not the only tradition in the early Church. 'So far as Catholicity goes, it is certain that the followers of the Logos doctrine do not (at least until the period of evil peace after Origen's death and probably till the end of the century) represent more than a small proportion of the Christians of the East.' The majority, like the apostles, started from the first commandment, and regarded the Divine Monarchy as the first truth. Paul of Samosata had historical tradition behind him when he challenged belief in a pre-existent personal Logos as polytheism and interpreted Jesus Christ as a man in whom the Logos dwelt 'not personally (*or* essentially), but as a quality.' Diodore of Tarsus, whose teaching was the main objective of Apollinarius's attack, represents the same line of thought, and he is succeeded by Diodore of Mopsuestia and then by Nestorius. This Antiochene school is characterized by the strong emphasis which it laid upon the ethical quality of Christ's life, while in its close study of historical fact it shows affinities with the modern spirit.

It is in a comment upon the condemnation of Paul of Samosata (p. 67) that Dr. Raven indicates most explicitly his own standpoint: 'What was wanted was a frank recognition that their preconceptions were wrong, a recognition that Very God and Very Man are neither contradictory nor separable, that man is only perfect if perfectly united with God, that Very God for us men at least (and with this alone we are concerned) is necessarily Very Man.' I do not feel sure how far this statement takes us, nor am I certain that I grasp its meaning. I do

not understand why for us men Very God is *necessarily* Very Man. Some not inconsiderable thinkers—Hume, for instance—have believed in God, but have held it inconceivable that God acts on principles which we recognize as moral. There is much in the world to lend plausibility to such a view, and nothing, so far as I can see, to make it *necessary* to suppose that Very God is Very Man. A Christian must believe that God has manifested Himself in Jesus Christ, but does this justify us in saying that the two terms God and Man, taken at their highest, coincide? I write this with diffidence, for I have no clear-cut theory of my own, and I do not feel sure that I have succeeded in catching Dr. Raven's thought.

I would only add one other point. I am inclined to think that Dr. Raven lays too much to the account of Greek philosophy. Jewish Monotheism is very different from Greek speculative Theism, but it lends even less support to the idea that God and Man necessarily imply one another. God is represented in the Gospels as a Being who orders and cares for the whole world of nature and of man. This no man, however good, could do. To the Jewish mind, a man who claimed to be God was guilty of blasphemy. But the earliest disciples were Jews, and I think it would be hard to justify from the New Testament Dr. Raven's assertion in his opening sentence that 'His disciples *from the first* claimed that Jesus was for them and for mankind *God and Lord*' (italics mine).

But this is an excellent book. It will be read by scholars, and it should be read by all educated persons who wish to understand the movements of thought which have shaped the doctrines of the Church.

On p. 290, ll. 7, 20, Dr. Raven translates *sensus* by 'sense' (= αἴσθησις), though in a footnote he remarks that *sensus* may represent νοῦς. The passage appears to demand the latter meaning. *Sensus* for νοῦς is normal in late Latin. Cf. pseudo-Apuleius *Asclepius*, *passim* and *Dig.* ix, 1. 1. 3 (quoted in L. & S. s. v.). *Nec potest animal iniuriam fecisse, quod sensu caret.*

J. M. CREED.

SHAKESPEARE'S RELIGION.¹

Shakespeare may now be included in the list of subjects upon which everyone, however ill-informed, feels competent to pass an opinion. Indeed, so long as an opinion is novel, it is sure of a generous reception, and the question of historical evidence is regarded as secondary. This would be all very well if no evidence were available, but, in point of fact, a vast mass of material awaits the student, and Mr. Fripp's book on Richard Quyny, Shakespeare's friend, is an example of the sort of work that is really worth doing. This book will not only interest Shakespearean students, nor will it be of value only to students of town institutions, it sheds much light on the condition of religion in England during the reign of Elizabeth.

Stratford was undoubtedly a characteristic Puritan borough: its leading fathers, not to say the whole Corporation, were more or less strongly imbued with Reformation principles. The action of the Borough Council was persistently hostile to the Romanists. John Shakespeare, the poet's father, it can no longer be doubted, was a leader on the Protestant side in a day when Protestantism was practically equivalent to Puritanism.

¹ *Master Richard Quyny*, by Edgar I. Fripp. (Oxford University Press, 1924; 10/6 net.)

Further than this, there is evidence of the existence of a little inner Puritan brotherhood of which the Lawyer and Latinist Abraham Sturley was a leading figure. The members of this circle called one another 'brothers' and 'sisters' somewhat as the members of the older Christian brotherhood at Oxford who had their seat at Christ Church a generation earlier.

Abraham Sturley himself came to Stratford as a lawyer, and was legat agent to Sir Thomas Lucy, possibly in partnership with Henry Rogers, the Town Clerk of Stratford. Sturley was on the closest terms of friendship with Richard Quyny, Shakespeare's friend; and both Sturley and Quyny were members of the Puritan brotherhood referred to. Sturley's letters are fairly numerous, and are full of expressions of the most sincerely devout character. Much of his correspondence is in Latin, which Quyny evidently well understood. Misfortune in the shape of fires afflicted both of them, and Sturley's consolation to his brother in affliction is interesting and characteristic, being thoroughly Calvinistic throughout. The best of his letters show Calvinism at its best. Thus, after having had his house burnt down, he writes:

'But I may weary you with reading, as I should be with writing were it not to you, whose company and colloquy I seem for the time to entertain. *Homo homini deus, et homo homini lupus.*² The Lord for my strong sins hath raised up against me these strong scourges and whips to chastise, afflict and persecute me, yet leaveth me not without comfort in yourself and other good means. . . . His holy name be sanctified, His will be done in earth as in heaven! Fare ye well, good brother in the Lord, who make you and me partakers of those comforts which belong to his beloved.'

A letter on p. 140, where Mistress Quyny is called 'my sister,' is in similar strain:

'*Non imponet nobis ultra quam ferre possumus: in nullam aeternitatem se deferaturum sibi confidentibus: ergo in auctore consolationis habeamus consolationem.*'³

How did all this affect Shakespeare? The Calvinist element in Shakespeare is undoubted. He is an out-and-out predestinarian; there is no free-will in him as there is in Dante. The destinies of Shakespeare's characters are determined from the beginning: their circumstances and still more their tempers determine their fate. Not merely Romeo and Juliet, but all his tragic figures are ill-starred;⁴ they could not do other than they do—it is all inevitable. Shakespeare's great power lies in his showing how the things you expect work themselves out. Nevertheless Shakespeare undoubtedly strains hard at the cords of his native Puritanism. Mr. Fripp's section on *Shakespeare's Early Sympathies with Anglo-Catholicism* is convincing (pp. 75 ff):

'He followed the Queen and Richard Hooker, and the younger men at Whitehall and Greenwich, who were not afraid of the Pop nor of old "Romish" practices. Politically and ethically he was his father's son; but in matters of worship his heart was elsewhere, with

² Erasmus' *Adagia*, and Plautus' *Trinummus*.

³ 'He will not place upon us burdens beyond what we can bear: He will never fail those that trust in Him; therefore let us find our consolation in the giver of consolation.'

⁴ Is this not contradicted in such utterances as: 'It is not in our stars, but in ourselves that we are underlings'? or 'Oft in ourselves those remedies do lie which we ascribe to heaven.'—Ed M.C.

his mother, perhaps, and his old schoolmaster, Simon Hunt, who had left Protestantism for the Catholic Church. Travelling through England with the players, he had witnessed with pain the ruined abbeys, "Bare ruined choirs, where late the sweet birds sang." "

If Mr. Fripp's book does nothing else, it should have disposed finally of the 'Stratford boor' theory. There is no evidence that the poet was removed prematurely from school, nor that his parents were illiterate, nor that he resided in a bookless neighbourhood.

'On the contrary, the evidence, which is continually growing, points in the opposite direction—that Shakespeare had an excellent schooling under Oxford graduates; that his father and mother were people likely to be interested in his education; that his father was a man of remarkable abilities and independence of judgment (for three successive years Acting-Chamberlain of the Borough, in charge of the Corporation estate and its finances), and well able to use his pen.'

This is a book containing the results of an immense labour of research. We have here Shakespearean scholarship at its best. J.C.H.

ANOTHER BOOK ON THE EUCHARIST.*

This little book is a praiseworthy attempt to examine, within a small compass, the various doctrines and ideas which have grown up around the sacrament of Holy Communion since the time of its institution by our Lord. The purpose of the writer is to sift the true from the false, and to offer a reasoned and Scriptural doctrine of the Eucharist which may commend itself as a basis for re-union.

In its main outline, Mr. Rule's presentation of Eucharistic doctrine appears to be in harmony with our own liturgy, and with the sound teaching of Article XXVIII. For this reason, we are doubtful whether it will achieve success where Cranmer and Hooker have failed. On the contrary, the author's brief historical survey tends to reveal the great divergence between the 'literalist' and the 'mystical' conceptions of the Eucharist, which has persisted from the days of the Fourth Gospel; but to the modern-minded man, it is the mystical conception of the Eucharist which appeals.

W. E. J. LINDFIELD.

A COMMENTARY FOR LAYMEN.†

In the past, the Epistle of the Hebrews has often been pressed into the service of sacerdotalism, but in recent years it has received a more liberal interpretation by Bishop Westcott, Dr. Nairne, Professor C. F. Scott, and by Dr. Glover in his delightful essay in *The Pilgrim*. Dr. Scott says of this Epistle that 'it stands solitary and mysterious, "without father, without mother, without genealogy," like that Melchizedek on whom its argument turns.'

Mr. Wade, who is a Somersetshire Vicar, makes no attempt to deal with the critical problems of the Epistle. His little volume is offered as

* *The Doctrine of the Holy Eucharist: An Eirenicon*, by U. Z. Rule. (Elliott Stock, 1924. 2/6 net.)

† *The Epistle to the Hebrews*, by Rev. J. H. Wade, M.A. (Skeffington, 1924. 2/6 net.)

'a plea for the renewed consideration of a book which in "these latter days" has much to teach us' (Preface). It sets forth in a clear and readable way the practical teaching of one of the noblest documents of Christian antiquity: and it seeks to relate the message of the Epistle to the restlessness and spiritual despondency of our own time. The latter half of the book consists of a very good commentary, the usefulness of which is somewhat impaired by the absence of the text of the Epistle.

W. E. J. LINDFIELD.

CORRESPONDENCE

EVOLUTION A VITAL PHENOMENON.

TO THE EDITOR OF *The Modern Churchman*.

SIR,

Allow me to thank you most heartily for your wise and discriminating criticism of my paper entitled 'Evolution a Vital Phenomenon,' which was read at the Conference held at Oxford last August and which has been published in your September issue. As I stated in my opening remarks, my purpose in coming to Oxford was not to emphasise a negative attitude, but to make clear to my clerical friends what are the difficulties which must be faced and overcome before any reconciliation between the scientific and religious views is possible.

With much of your criticism I agree, but there are one or two points where I feel that the difficulty has not been clearly realised. I agree that in a condition of life where there are no rules, there can be no breach of them and therefore no sin; but I certainly would not describe a passage from a state of pure individualism to a state of incipient society as a 'fall.' Wherever society begins there is the beginning of sin, and there are signs of it in the incipient societies of even rooks and penguins! Further, I agree that evolution does not necessarily lead to progress. Far from it! The evidence is rather that evolutionary progress is exceptional, but that when it occurs those that exhibit it sweep over the earth exterminating all their rivals. Most tribes exposed to easy circumstances either remain the same or degenerate. Man and animals alike progress only when stirred to it by the whip of necessity. As to your remarks on the Pauline doctrine of election I confess I cannot agree. I was brought up a Calvinist and it seems to me that nothing could be more terribly explicit than the ninth chapter of Romans. 'Jacob have I loved and Esau have I hated,' is hard to explain away, and what are we to think of a writer who bases his case on the old legend of Jacob and Esau, which anthropologists assure us is only a form of a world-wide myth based on the primitive awe of twin-births?

You are however perfectly right in stating that the real difficulty raised for theology by biology is the cruelty of Nature. There is, it seems to me, only one possible way of getting round it. If life be, as I think it is, more than mere organisation, that is, in the last resort the mutual positions of atoms and molecules, then when the body is dissolved, that something which constitutes life must somehow persist. Everything—man included—that knows and feels and suffers must somehow have that suffering made good—must feel that its ultimate satisfaction is the greater and more perfect because of the suffering that has gone before. God has no right to call a sentient being into existence and sacrifice it without its willing co-operation for any but its own good.

An old Calvinist tutor of the last century put the case in an old-fashioned way but trenchantly, when he said: 'It will not be Man alone who will be on his trial at the Last Day—God will also be on His trial, and unless He can show that everything that has happened to every creature has been arranged for its good He will not be the God Whom the Universe expects Him to be.'

E. W. MACBRIDE.

[We surrender the point about the Pauline doctrine of election.—ED. M.C.]

DR. TENNANT'S REPLY TO DR. MACAN.

TO THE EDITOR OF *The Modern Churchman*.

SIR,

Readers of the *Modern Churchman* will doubtless expect from me a reply to Dr. Macan's strictures on the paper which I read at Oxford, especially as they have appeared to some to be of value. Being unable to guess which will be deemed the more important, I had better briefly deal with all.

1. I am charged with an incorrect 'derivation' of law. In the sense of 'derivation' contemplated, I offered none, incorrect or other.

2. I had distinguished two kinds of understanding: science's analysis of structure, and interpretation in terms of worth, meaning, amenability to ends, etc. Not having noted what was plainly written, my critic refutes an altogether different distinction of his own making.

3. I had said that if 'rational' be restricted (as it often has been) to the formally logical, and if 'reason' be applied to inductive discovery, then in 'reason' there is a non-rational factor. This is pronounced 'nonsense,' because there cannot be the non-rational in the 'rational'! My critic should have objected to 'reason' being applied to inductive discovery, etc., if he wished to object; but, historically, that is one of the commonest meanings of 'reason,' and one without which all talk of 'reasonableness' must cease.

4. I am accused of making 'great play' with 'necessity.' I merely distinguished between logical and actual necessity. The 'play' is Dr. Macan's own in attributing to me several statements about the necessary that I never made nor implied.

5. Dr. Macan cavils at 'brute fact.' I am not so ignorant of the subjects I teach as to suppose there is any *absolutely* brute fact such as sensation without germinal thought. Had I said so, he would have been to the point. I merely mean that in a simple percept there is an element (such as blue) which cannot be volatilised into an abstract idea or be deduced from perfected science, physical and psychological.

6. My description of the electron as 'a concept' is objected to on the ground that, with keener senses, we should perceive it. I know not how Dr. Macan knows this. If electrons are potential percepts, on like grounds ether must be: and I wonder which one of the many incompatible ethers, each serviceable to theoretical physics, is the percept while the rest are concepts.

7. To distinguish different uses of the word 'nature' is accounted to be 'nimble.' Discrimination of things that differ may be called by any opprobrious term my critic chooses, but it is the only alternative to muddle-headedness.

8. In calling attention to my 'fundamental fallacy' Dr. Macan attributes to me some more assertions that I did not make: that law is broken by God, and that miracles occur. I merely argued that science does not and cannot rule miracle to be impossible, or the world to be a 'closed system.' My critic seems ignorant of the meaning of that technical phrase, else he could not suggest the possibility of an open system being a contradiction in terms. He has overlooked the fact that in the part of my paper now in question I was dealing solely with science; with such metaphysic as would regard law as immutable and universal, I had dealt earlier. Thus he ignores the issue. My 'fundamental fallacy' consists in being inconsistent with his dogmatic philosophy, previously represented by me as untenable, and not with my own version of natural science. And he himself appears to find room for the activity of God on the physical world provided God's acts may be called secondary causes. I have no objection to such terminological inexactitude, if the issue be but a matter of words. I only wish to retain the distinction between God's possible acts (the supernatural) and Nature's intrinsic activities (the natural).

9. The name of my inconsistencies 'is legion.' Only one—my critic's misunderstanding—has as yet been indicated; but three further samples are now adduced. (1) I call laws of Nature both human descriptions and yet perhaps Nature's prescriptions. In so far as man finds the words and symbolisms and Nature determines their application, we surely have two sides of the same affair, and no contradiction. (2) I make 'necessity' a pre-condition of unconditional science, yet reign of law no pre-condition of the possibility of experience. There is no contradiction here unless 'unconditional science' and 'experience' are synonyms: and they are not. Nor is there false analysis, as my critic asserts, unless the Kantian theory of knowledge be beyond question: and it is not. (3) I am said to polemise against descriptionism, yet it is my own theory. What I have maintained is that descriptionism is right in saying laws are descriptions, wrong if it imply that they are no more than descriptions of 'how' or 'like what': again no semblance, even, of contradiction. If these are the most damaging instances of inconsistency that my critic can allege, those who had been indiscriminating enough not to discover the 'legion' need not be profoundly shaken in self-esteem.

In conclusion, I can afford to overlook the 'magisterial' attitude that Dr. Macan has been pleased to adopt towards me; but his charge of 'hedging,' unsupported by any instance, I resent.

F. R. TENNANT.

DR. MACAN'S REPLY.

SIR,

1. The use of the term 'Law' in a metaphysical or analogical sense (as in 'Reign of Law,' 'Laws of Nature'), implies a derivation from some primary meaning, or use; even if the derivation is 'implicit.' But it is not merely implicit in Dr. Tennant's paper. He says, indeed, 'save for some gain in clearness of exposition it is needless because irrelevant to discuss the question how the conception of law, as applied to Nature, was derived.' (p. 305). But he goes on to 'grant' that mankind would never have thought of physical phenomena happening 'according to law' had they not first made laws for the regulation of their own behaviour; or, in other words, that '*the notion of physical law was derived from the civic*

or *forensic notion*.' He 'grants,' that is, that the idea of law as 'reigning' in nature is 'derived' from the idea of law as enacted in human 'legislation': and he describes this idea of law as 'the original meaning of law.' (p. 306). I pointed out that the original meaning of law was not legislative enactment, but custom; and that science, in conceiving 'law' as descriptive and indicative, rather than as prescriptive and imperative, was restoring, or resorting to, a still more 'original' meaning of law.

2. The two kinds of 'Understanding.' Dr. Tennant (pp. 309 f.) distinguishes between 'understanding' in the restricted sense in which science pursues 'wisdom,' and 'understanding' in some extended, and apparently unscientific sense, that is 'knowledge which counts most in practical life,' but is 'quite different from the scientific type.' The scientific type he elucidates by reference to the German verb *begreifen*, the practical type by reference to the German verb *verstehen*, for the benefit of those who understand German. I ventured to retain the term 'Understanding' for the former, and to apply the term 'Wisdom' to the latter type, or kind of Understanding: and I got the term from Dr. Tennant. I do not understand, in any or either sense, his grievance.

3. I confess that I still do not follow Dr. Tennant's antithesis, or contrast, between 'rational' and 'reasonable,' in philosophic parlance. If the rational has an a-logical element in it, then it seems to me that the reasonable also must have an a-logical element in it. And again I do not see the sense of ascribing an a-logical element to the rational, or the reasonable, which appears to me to be tantamount to saying that the rational is irrational. I admit, of course, that man, for example, though a rational animal is often unreasonable, but not *qua* rational.

4. 'Necessity' is, I admit, a dangerous plaything. My apparently too playful references to Dr. Tennant's applications of the term disguised my bewilderment. I confess that I cannot make head or tail of such an assertion as the following: 'That there has been, as a matter of fact, a certain amount of uniformity and of *necessary connection* between phenomena up to date, we have the *best reasons* to believe.' (p. 309). (The italics are mine.) What does 'a certain amount of necessary connection between phenomena' mean? And what are 'the best reasons'?—I confess that Dr. Tennant's terminological exactitudes rather baffle me.

5. I am said to have 'cavilled' at the distinction between 'facts' and 'brute facts.' I said nothing about '*absolutely* brute facts,' nor was Dr. Tennant's original formula '*relatively* brute facts.' I am quite willing to agree that all facts, whether simple or complex, have an element or datum in them which is not rational, but sensible (though, if I understand Dr. Tennant right, he would admit that even to be perceived the fact must have a rational element, or 'germinal thought' in it). There is nothing here but the word 'brute' between us, which appears to me to be rhetoric rather than logic.

6. I am not a physicist, and when I trespass on Physics I do so with all the undogmatic humility of which a rational animal may be capable: but, when the physicist tells me that matter is made up of molecules, and molecules of atoms, and atoms of electrons (and protons), I suppose that this analysis is, so to speak, continuous, and *in pari materia*, and that, if 'matter' is sensibly perceptible, then its elements, or constituents must be, potentially at least, sensible: I do not say visible. Of course the analysis may be wrong: there may be no such things as electrons. If the 'elements' are perceptible—and I suppose they are—then I suppose also that the

atoms of which, as I am told, they consist, and again the electrons (and protons) of which, as I am told, the atoms themselves consist, might be perceptible, if our senses, or our instruments, were sufficiently delicate. Whether all this physical analysis is fact or mere's nest I do not pretend to know: but it seems to work fairly well at present.

7. I don't think that 'nimble' can be at once an 'opprobrious term' and descriptive of 'the only alternative to muddle-headedness.' But I own that the word might be taken to convey a left-handed compliment, and I will try and put the point of my difficulty over Dr. Tennant's description of Nature more respectfully. It goes back partly to his distinction between 'fact' and 'brute fact' and to his apparent identification of Nature with the latter (as on p. 308: 'the conception of law as applied to actual Nature, or to brute fact'): partly to the contrast between this actual Nature, 'the primary, concrete, largely a-logical actuality, or 'Nature' which is really 'there,' and 'the scientific artifact, which has received the name of Nature' and is 'patient of quantitative law' (p. 315). One of these Natures is obviously supposed to be made up of 'brute facts' before scientific analysis and reflexion have got to work upon it: the other, the orderly Nature, is an artificial product of the human mind, and not perhaps of much importance or significance. If I may put it so, the first Nature is Nature as it emerged, or emerges, from the hand of God, the second is Nature as it finds itself in the Mind of Man. Yet Dr. Tennant proceeds to assume that 'law abidingness is a characteristic of primary reality' (of 'brute facts'? of 'actual' Nature?), 'for the sake of argument,' and we find ourselves back among the Deists, and their world as a mechanism: or better still, in a world 'consisting' of a plurality of substances or continuants, whose determinate nature bespeaks determinate relations and interactions; so that there is a *nexus* of causation, immanent and transeunt, which is the stable basis of a reign of law' (p. 317). What, then, has become of the distinction between 'actual Nature' and 'the scientific artifact'? Naturally one hardly knows where one is, or what has become of the brute fact.

8. If it is admitted that Reality is law-abiding, that Nature is a world of 'determinate relations and interactions,' in short, under the reign of law; and asserted that there is, nevertheless, 'interference' *ab extra* with the Order of Nature: is not this tantamount to saying that the laws are abrogated, that miracles are wrought? And by whom, if not by God? I really cannot understand Dr. Tennant's objection to my gloss upon his argument, unless he is prepared to say that miracles do not occur, and that God does not interfere with the order of Nature.

9. Dr. Tennant expresses 'resentment' at the charge of 'hedging,' which, as he says, I made against him. I hope the feeling is not deep, or irremovable. If I had made any charge against his honour or good faith, I could better understand his feeling, and I should be not merely distressed—as I am—but rather ashamed of myself. I did use the word 'hedging,' as descriptive of the 'impression' made upon my mind by his paper, and I wish now that I had thought of some happier and more friendly metaphor: for example, 'playing for safety' might have been inoffensive, though less precise. For what is 'hedging' in this connection? A metaphor borrowed from the Turf, or the betting ring. And what does it mean there? My dictionary answers: 'to bet so as to offset, partly or wholly, a bet already made.' Is there anything essentially dishonourable in that? I cannot see that there is. But I daresay 'hedging' is practised at times not merely to avoid loss, but in such a way as to mislead the ring: as, for example,

if the one bet is open, and the other secret. But there could not possibly have been any such connotation in the term as used of a philosophical paper, which was all printed, and published, above board. Dr. Tennant's resentment was the deeper, apparently, because I made the charge—that is, I used that Newmarket metaphor—without supporting its use with instances. But were not two or three instances immediately given of 'backing' two contrary or rival opinions or conceptions, as of Law of Nature (as 'descriptive' or 'prescriptive') and of 'prescriptive Law' (or Necessity) as a pre-condition of Science but not of Experience? And here I did not overlook, but expressly recognized Dr. Tennant's own distinction, or 'dualism' as I might call it, between Science and Experience, while indicating that the distinction did not appear to me to save him, since Science (in my judgment) was only consciously organized Experience. But I admit that the particular instances are far from supplying the whole 'impression' produced by a paper which seems to me to be backing the Reign of Law, and the Abrogation of Law, an Order of Nature, and a disordering of Nature produced by 'Interference *ab extra*,' the co-existence in one Universe (presumably) of the Natural and the Supernatural, not as two aspects of any and every object, or event, but as 'two mutually exclusive classes of phenomena': I take this phrase from another paper read at the Conference, in which, coming three days after Dr. Tennant's paper, Mr. Russell actually inserted a passage indicating the respect in which he regarded Dr. Tennant's paper as 'misleading.' It was Mr. Russell's Excursus which led me to intervene, for I thought at the time (and still think) that, although his reply to Dr. Tennant (now printed in the Conference number of the *Modern Churchman*, pp. 377 f.) was an admirable *argumentum ad hominem*, it invited supplement by an *argumentum ad rem*, based upon the analysis of the conditions of all knowledge and experience. This is, of course, what Dr. Tennant calls my 'dogmatism.' I will not retort by calling him a sceptic; for, although he has rejected (under nine heads) my attempted analysis of his main argument, he has taken no exception to my account of his 'admissions'; and these admissions bring him very near to Mr. Russell's point of view, from which the 'natural' and the 'super-natural' are but two aspects of any and every phenomenon, according as it is related, in the mind of the observer, to the idea of law, or to the idea of divine purpose. That must be (I suppose) just what Dr. Tennant means when he expressly asserts that all the natural is in some sense supernatural, and goes on to affirm that God is the Mind, or Spirit, which not only 'made' law-abiding things, but 'inspired them with a perhaps increasing purpose, guides them, controls them.' Surely a God, who is inspiring and guiding and controlling Nature, with a perhaps increasing purpose is 'interfering' everywhere all the time: and if everything is, or may be, viewed as a result of such ceaseless 'interference,' there is an end of the opposition, or mutual exclusion, of the Natural and the Supernatural. But that was not (if I at all understand him) the key-note, or dominant, of Dr. Tennant's paper: it was rather an 'admission,' which seemed to me a very welcome alternative to the 'planted out order of Nature' which is supposed to be 'largely left to work out its potentialities by itself' (p. 317), and was also supposed, by me at least, to be more in accordance with the general argument and drift of Dr. Tennant's paper.

But here, in conclusion of my contribution to the discussion, I would venture to ask whether the time is not come for philosophers and theologians to cease personifying, or at least envisaging, 'Nature' as an order, a power, a world, independent of God, with intrinsic laws and processes

operative, except when 'the Deity' interferes? This *Weltanschauung* looks (to me) like a survival, or revival, of the old Deism, and its mechanistic view of the world, and ill accords with a world of organic evolution and life, the theatre of a divine and 'increasing purpose,' or, as I might prefer to say, of an ever unfolding and growing revelation. The word 'nature' is, in fact, co-extensive with existence: it is, so to speak, a category, to which not merely the physical and the organic but the human and the divine submit themselves. None but a fool—even if an innocent fool—doubts the existence of God: but the nature of God is still perhaps in process of revelation, or discovery: though I sometimes think it—let me say in all reverence—a simpler problem than the nature of man. So too, it sometimes almost seems to me as though the only miracle in the world were that incomprehensible, incongruous, anarchic horror and absurdity, Sin: for which, nevertheless, no Churchman, ancient or modern, will hold God accountable. I see that Mr. Russell remarks that the admission of 'human freedom' introduces a 'disturbing element': but he adds that such disturbance does not in itself constitute a 'supernatural' factor, at least in a religious sense. I have made a somewhat similar admission, and felt after a somewhat similar solution of the difficulty, in my remarks under the heading of 'Interference' (Conference number, p. 211). I am very far from pretending to offer an adequate theory of the problem of human 'freedom.' When we enter the self-conscious, the spiritual, the personal world, the kingdom of ends, why then, indeed, I might find myself falling back on a sort of dogmatism—or would it be mysticism? It is uncommonly hard to rationalize that region; and yet one cannot surrender to Unreason. I repeat that, to my mind, the nature (and destiny) of man is now the greatest difficulty; and I would only venture, very tentatively, to suggest that we might get nearer to reality, or to truth, by seeking a solution not in the complete self-realisation of the human individual as such, but rather in terms of a fully realized or complete Society, provided that its citizens are the spirits of the just made perfect—the veritable *civitas Dei*.

REGINALD W. MACAN.

THE RESERVATION OF THE SACRAMENT.

The Rev. R. G. Parsons has written to us with reference to an article on the Reservation of the Sacrament which appeared in our July issue (pp. 159-160), in which we criticize severely the action of the House of Clergy in regard to Reservation. He points out that their action is in entire agreement with the policy of the Bishop of Gloucester which we commend in the same article. That Mr. Parsons, who is an active member of the House of Clergy, is entirely right, we have no doubt. We regret that we should have been led astray by abbreviated and partial reports of the proceedings of the House of Clergy.—ED M.C.

AT A MUSICAL SERVICE.

O God, whose servant David did praise Thee upon the harp, mercifully accept this our service of Music and Song. Grant us by thy Holy Spirit we humbly beseech Thee, the vision of Thine Eternal Harmony of Which all earthly music is but a shadow, that we may have rest to our souls through the same Jesus Christ our Saviour. Amen.
Fugue in C minor. Bach-Elgar.

SOUTHWARK CATHEDRAL, Feb. 1923.

C. H. S.